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I. Introduction
International trade has been a prominent issue in the United
States in the 1990's. From trade wars with Japan' to the Cuban
embargo,2 America's international trade policy has been used to
encourage changes in the domestic policy of foreign countries,
while America's domestic policy has been used to promote
international trade. Some of the most heated domestic political
controversies of this decade have concerned American
participation in international trade agreements for the promotion of
free trade.3
Of these debates, one of the most disputed centered on the
membership of the United States in the World Trade Organization
(WTO), an international trade body that was the product of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The WTO is
an umbrella organization that administers many international trade
agreements including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
I See, e.g., Bob Davis & Michael Williams, U.S., Japan Usher in a Nastier New
Era, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1995, at Al.
2 See, e.g., House Votes to Tighten Cuban Economic Embargo, WALL ST. J., Mar.
7, 1996, at A22.
3 See, e.g., Bob Davis, The Outlook: Free Trade Is Headed For More Hot Debate,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1996, at Al.
4 The Uruguay Round began in 1986 at Punta del Este and concluded in 1993.
Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road From GATT to MTO, 3 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 35, 57 (1994). All of the agreements that survived the Uruguay Round
are included in one agreement. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
Final Act]. The text of the Final Act is also available on the Internet. International
Trade Law Monitor, World Trade Organization Agreement File (visited Nov. 15, 1996)
<http:itl.irv.uit.no/trade-law/nav/free-tradehtml> The World Trade Organization was
established by this act. Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Part II, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
5 The original agreement was negotiated in the 1940s. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947], reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE (1994) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL INDEX]. An individual nation applying the
provisions of GATT 1947 was called a "contracting party" rather than a Member
because GATT 1947 did not provide for membership as such in an organization. See
GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXV, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX at 810. When
"acting jointly," GATT 1947 nations were called "CONTRACTING PARTIES." GATT
1947, supra note 5, art. XXV, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 810.
GATT 1947 was incorporated as GATT 1994 into the Final Act without substantial
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GATT 1947 was drafted after World War II for the limited
purpose of tariff reduction, but has become the most influential
trade agreement of this century.6 GATT 1947 was not meant to be
an international trade organization, and as a result was ill-equipped
for such functions as dispute resolution among the contracting
parties.7 Under the WTO, GATT 1947 was incorporated as GATT
1994, and the WTO's dispute resolution abilities were notably
expanded and strengthened by the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 8 These
reforms were welcomed by free trade advocates desirous of a
stricter method of enforcing the trade requirements of GATT 1994.
The unchanged provisions of GATT 1994 and the new dispute
resolution mechanism of the DSU were, however, met with
criticism from many environmentalists. Just as international trade
has been a hot topic in recent years, so has environmental
alterations. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marakesh Agreement Establishing
the Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT 1994]. (Note: under the WTO Agreement GATT 1994 incorporates by reference
GATT 1947 in its entirety. WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. II, para. 4, 33 I.L.M. at
1145. Therefore, following each GATT 1994 cite the author will provide a parallel cite
to GATT 1947 in parentheses.) Nations that have acceded to GATT 1994 are referred to
as Members. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, Annex IA interpretive note 1.d.i, 33
I.L.M. at 1155. Approval by the United States Congress of implementing legislation in
December 1994 opened the way for ratification by all 124 GATT 1947 signatory states.
Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1995). See David E.
Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs; A Victory for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 1994, at Al, A22.
6 ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
4-8 (1975). For a general discussion of GATT 1947 see id. and JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
7 Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order For
World Trade, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 352-54 (1995). For a general discussion of the
shortcomings of the dispute resolution mechanisms of GATT 1947 see Robert E. Hudec,
Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND: A RESULTS ORIENTED
APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180-204 (Jeffrey Schott ed., 1990); and
JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990).
8 Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14,
1994, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. For a general discussion of
the new dispute resolution mechanisms of the DSU see Judith H. Bello & Alan H.
Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net
Benefits, 28 INT'L LAW. 1095, 1099 (1994); Timothy A. Harr, WTO Dispute Settlement
Provisions, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT 579-
84 (1995); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in
the GAiT, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 477 (1994); and JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, THE URUGUAY
ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 125-32 (1994).
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protection.9 From news about the depletion of the ozone layer"0 to
environmental disasters such as Chernobyl," concern about the
environment has received tremendous attention in the United
States. As a result, measures advancing the policy of
environmental protection were adopted by the United States
government.
Environmental protection was not, however, of great public
concern when GATT 1947 was drafted and therefore was not
directly addressed in its provisions. When a contracting party to
GATT 1947 believed that an environmental measure of another
contracting party was a trade restriction in violation of GATT
1947, the complaining party could utilize GATT 1947's dispute
settlement process to attempt to invalidate the environmental
measure. Because there were no specific environmental
provisions in GATT 1947, domestic environmental regulations
were treated as ordinary trade measures and could therefore be
found to be inconsistent with GATT 1947. As a result, the status
of domestic environmental regulations was threatened by the
possibility of being found in violation of GATT 1947.12
This possibility highlighted the conflict between the goals of
free trade and environmental protection, 3 a conflict that was most
9 See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Both Parties Paint Themselves Green But Trend of
Looser Environmental Rules Is Seen Continuing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1996.
10 See, e.g., Barbara Roseovicz, Highflying Scientists Watch Ozone Drift, WALL ST.
J., July, 31,1995, at B3.
I See, e.g., Soviet Disaster: Ukrainian Nuclear Fire Spreads Wide Tragedy With
Radiation Cloud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1986, at 1-1.
12 See generally Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental
Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 756-71 (1993) (analyzing unilateral
environmental measures for GATT 1947 consistency); Betsy Baker, Protection, Not
Protectionism: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT, 26 VAia. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 437 (1993) (analyzing multilateral environmental agreements for GATT
1947 consistency); Steve Chamovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GA TT Rules and Their
Application to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299 (1994)
(analyzing four different types of environmental measures for GATT 1947 consistency);
Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GA TT System, 24 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 433 (1995) (analyzing unilateral environmental measures for GATT 1947
consistency); William J. Snape III & Naomi B. Letkovitz, Searching for GATT's
Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting "Due Process?, " 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 483 (1994) (analyzing environmental process standards for GATT
1947 consistency).
13 See generally TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, pt. III (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds.,
1993) (debating the conflicts between trade and the environment); Alberto Bernabe-
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clearly illustrated by two GATT 1947 decisions that a United
States environmental measure restricting tuna imports was
unjustifiably inconsistent with GATT 1947.14 These decisions
prompted significant scholarly debate and calls for the reform of
GATT 1947 to recognize the importance of environmental
protection.
1 5
This tenuous position of domestic environmental regulation
under GATT 1947 may have become more precarious as a result
of the completion of the Uruguay Round. GATT 1994 does not
include any provisions addressing environmental regulations, and
the DSU has strengthened the GATT 1994 dispute settlement
procedure. As a result, the possibility that domestic environmental
regulation will be undermined by the WTO has increased.
This tension between the goals of free trade and environmental
protection also implicitly involves the conflict between the power
of the WTO and the sovereignty of its member nations. 6 This
Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream ": Globalization and Harmonization of
Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205, 207 (1995) (considering
whether "the conflict between the theory of free trade and the attempts by national and
local governments to protect the environment" are "irreconcilable"); Steve Charnovitz,
The Environment Vs. Trade Rules. Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L, 475, 479 (1992)
(assessing the "trade versus environment debate"); Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the
Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principals,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1288 (1992) (describing the "clash between
international trade regulation and environmental protection"); Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 702 (1992) (examining the "tension between international free
trade and environmental quality"); Stefan, R. Miller, Comment, NAFTA: A Model for
Reconciling the Conflict between Free Trade and International Environmental
Protection, 56 U. PITT. L. REv. 483, 487-508 (1994) (discussing the potential conflict
between provisions of GATT 1947 and environmental measures).
14 United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at
155 (1993) (unadopted) (unpresented) [hereinafter U.S. Tuna I panel report]; GATT
Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839
(1994) (unadopted) [hereinafter U.S. Tuna II panel report].
15 These panel decisions prompted a large amount of scholarly comment. See, e.g.,
Carol J. Breyers, The U.S./Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: A Case Study of the GATT
and Environmental Progress, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 229 (1992); Ted L.
McDorman, The 1991 U.S.-Mexico GA TT Panel Report on Tuna and Dolphin, 17 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 461 (1992). C
16 See generally Zane 0. Gresham & Thomas A. Bloomfield, Rhetoric or Reality:
The Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Federal and State Environmental
Laws, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1143 (1995) ( considering whether U.S. sovereignty is
"being ceded to some powerful international trade bureaucracy"); John H. Jackson,
Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: International Economic
Law: Reflections on the "Boilerroom " of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
friction was illustrated by the United States Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Panel Report 7 and
Appellate Body Report. 8 These Reports concerned a dispute over
an environmental regulation of the United States and were the first
panel and Appellate Body reports to be issued under the new
GATT 1994 dispute resolution procedures of the DSU
administered by the WTO.' 9
The dispute in both U.S. Gasoline Reports centered on the
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives,0 a United States
regulation promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) under the Clean Air Act (CAA).2 To determine whether
the Gasoline Rule was an unjustified violation of GATT 1994, the
Panel faced two central issues. First the Panel had to determine
the extent of the national treatment provision of Article Ii1:4 of
GATT 1994.22 Second, if the Panel found that the Gasoline Rule
violated Article II1:4, it then had to determine if the Gasoline Rule
was justified by the national policy exceptions in Article XX(b),
(d), and (g) of GATT 1994.23 Most prior dispute settlement panels
& POL'Y 595, 602-06 (1995) (considering "how deeply the treaty norms 'intrude' into
what has been previously termed 'sovereign prerogative'); Kendall W. Stiles, The New
WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 D.C. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 3 (1995)
(considering whether the WTO threatens U.S. sovereign rights).
17 Available in Westlaw, G.A.T.T. database, no. 67528 (1996) [hereinafter U.S.
Gasoline Panel Report]. The Panel Report is also available on the Internet. Global
Environment and Trade Study, GETS Library, World Trade Organization Panel Report
on Venezuela Report (visited Nov. 15, 1996) <http://www.gets.org/gets>. For a
discussion of the Panel Report see Cynthia M. Maas, Should the WTO Expand GATT
Article .XA? An Analysis of United States-Standards For Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 415 (1996); and Steve Charnovitz, The WTO Panel
Decision on U.S. Clean Air Regulations, Int'l Trade Rep. [vol. 13] (BNA) No. 11, at 456
(1996). A final report of a WTO panel is comparable to a written decision of a United
States court. Both may contain the facts of the dispute, its procedural history, the
analysis used to decide the dispute and resolution of the dispute.
18 Available in Westlaw, G.A.T.T. database, no. 227476 (1996) [hereinafter U.S.
basoiine Appellate Body Report].
19 David E. Sanger, World Trade Group Orders US. to Alter Clean Air Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan., 18, 1996, at Cl, C5.
120 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1994) [hereinafter Gasoline Rule].
121 The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
22 GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. 111:4 (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. 111:4,
reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 115). For the relevant text of Article
111:4 see infra text accompanying note 283. For a discussion of the U.S. Gasoline
Panel's treatment of Article 111:4 see infra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
23 GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b), (d), (g) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art.
246 [Vol. 22
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had been narrow in their interpretation and application of these
GATT 1947 provisions.24 Following their lead, the U.S. Gasoline
Panel found that the Gasoline Rule violated Article III and was not
justified under Article XX of GATT 1994.25
On appeal, the Appellate Body simply had to consider whether
the Gasoline Rule's violation of Article 111:4 was justified under
Article XX(g) and the preamble to Article XX26 Following the
decisions of previous panels,27 but giving this provision a broader
reading than had the Panel, the Appellate Body found that the
Gasoline Rule did meet the specific requirements of Article
XX(g)2  In considering the preamble of Article XX,29 however,
the Appellate Body did not follow past panel decisions," and
instead narrowly interpreted the requirements of this provision,
holding that the Gasoline Rule was not a justifiable violation of
GATT 1994.31 As a result, the Appellate Body affirmed the
Panel's conclusion that the Gasoline Rule was an unjustifiable
violation of GATT 1994.2
The U.S. Gasoline Reports, therefore, are significant because
they illustrate the conflict between the WTO's goal of furthering
global free trade and its Members' goals of protecting their
domestic environmental sovereignty, a conflict that has become
increasingly significant as concerns for freer international trade
XX(b), (d), (g), reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518). For the relevant
text of Articles XX(b), (d), and (g) see infra text accompanying note 304. For a
discussion of the U.S. Gasoline Panel's treatment of Article XX(b), (d), and (g) see infra
notes 202-222 and accompanying text..
24 For a discussion of previous panel's interpretations and applications of Article
111:4 and Article XX(b), (d), and (g), see infra notes 271-345 and accompanying text.
25 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 8.1.
26 For the relevant text of Article XX(g) see infra text accompanying note 304.
For a discussion of the U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body's treatment of Article XX(g) see
infra notes 236-260 and accompanying text.
27 For a discussion of previous panel's interpretations and applications of Article
XX(g) see infra notes 323-337 and accompanying text.
28 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 13, 15.
29 For the relevant text of the preamble to Article XX see infra note 304. For a
discussion of the U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body's treatment of the preamble to Article
XX see infra notes 254-267 and accompanying text.
30 For a discussion of previous panels' interpretations and applications of the
preamble to Article XX see infra notes 338-345 and accompanying text.
31 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 20.
32 Id.
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and greater environmental protection have increased.33 More
basically, the U.S. Gasoline Reports indicate how GATT 1994 will
be interpreted and applied in disputes concerning United States
environmental measures.34 In addition, the Reports preview the
potential efficiency and enforceability of future GATT 1994
disputes.35 Because the recommendations of the U.S. Gasoline
Panel Report conflict with United States law, the Reports may also
indicate how United States sovereignty will be affected by its
membership in the WTO.36 The U.S. Gasoline Reports, therefore,
are illustrative of some of the most contentious contemporary
debates concerning world trade and environmental protection.
Part II of this Comment describes the dispute resolution
mechanisms of the Pre-Uruguay Round GATT 1947 and the Post-
Uruguay Round GATT 1994. 3" Part III examines the facts,
procedural history and decisions of the U.S. Gasoline Panel Report
and Appellate Body Report.38 Part IV reviews past panel reports
dealing with issues under Article 111:4 and Article XX(b), (d), and
(g) of GATT 1947. 39 Part V analyzes the significance of the U.S.
Gasoline Reports for sovereignty issues in the context of past
panel decisions and dispute resolution in the WTO.40 Part VI
comments on the potential for harmonization of free trade and
environmental protection policies suggested by this decision.4
33 For a discussion of the conflict between environmental protection and free trade
see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
34 For a discussion of the significance of the U.S. Gasoline Reports in light of past
panel reports see infra notes 346-355 and accompanying text.
35 For a discussion of the significance of the U.S. Gasoline Reports in light of the
DSUsee infra notes 376-393 and accompanying text.
36 For a discussion of the significance of the U.S. Gasoline Reports in light of
sovereignty issues see infra notes 394-417 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 42-141 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 142-270 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 271-345 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 346-417 and accompanying text.
41 See infra note 418 and accompanying text.
248 [Vol. 22
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II. Background Law I: Dispute Resolution
A. Pre- Uruguay Round Dispute Resolution
The original GATT 1947 had only skeletal provisions
concerning dispute resolution. All disputes arising under GATT
1947 were governed by Article XXII and Article XXIII. If a
contracting party had a complaint about a trade measure of another
contracting party they first looked to Article XXII. This Article
provided that:
1. Each [contracting] party... shall afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding ... such representations as may be made by
another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the
operation of [GATT 1947].
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting
party, consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any
matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution
through consultation under paragraph L"
This Article of GATT 1947 provided an opportunity for the
disputing parties to negotiate a resolution to their conflict
independently under Article XXII: 1, or with the assistance of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXII:2, before proceeding
further in the dispute resolution process.
If Article XXII consultations were unsuccessful, the
complaining party could then look to Article XXIII. This Article
provided in part that:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under [GATT 1947] is being nullified or
impaired ... as a result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under [GATT 1947] ... the contracting party
may... make written representations or proposals to the
other contracting party... which it considers to be
concerned ....
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is affected between the contracting
parties concerned... the matter may be referred to the
42 GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXII, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra
note 5, at 565.
1996] 249
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CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall
make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties
which they consider to be concerned ....
If the Contracting Parties consider that the circumstances are serious
enough... they may authorize a contracting party... to suspend the
application to any other contracting party... of concessions or other
obligations under [GATT 1947].4'
This GATT 1947 Article provided another opportunity for
settlement of a dispute before the CONTRACTING PARTIES were
directed to recommend a resolution to the dispute, and, if
necessary, use suspension of concessions or obligations to enforce
their recommendations.
If, after a dispute was settled under Article XXIII, a
contracting party failed to implement the recommendations of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, they were deemed to have violated
Article XXIII." In the United States, however, GATT 1947 came
into force by executive action as a treaty obligation under
international law through the Protocol of Provisional Application,45
not as a treaty approved by Congress." As a result, the
recommendations of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of GATT 1947
were not binding under United States law.47 The only means of
13 GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXIII, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra
note 5, at 586.
44 Dillon, supra note 7, at 388.
45 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947).
4 See John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 263 (1967).
47 Dillon, supra note 7, at 390-91; Miquel Montana I Mora, A GATT With Teeth:
Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 169 n.323 (1993). It has been argued, however, that if a panel
found a United States measure to be inconsistent with GATT 1947, the United States
Trade Representative would not need Congressional approval to implement the panel
decision. Steve Charnovitz, Trade and the Environment: The Environment v. Trade
Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 509 (1995). In fact, one GATT 1947
panel report, United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19,
1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993) (adopted) [hereinafter U.S. Alcohol
panel report], determined that GATT 1947 constituted US federal law and therefore held
that a GATT 1947-inconsistent state law was overridden by GATT 1947. Id. para. 5.80.
text For discussion of the U.S. Alcohol report see infra notes 288-297 and
accompanying. For a general discussion of implementing panel decisions in the U.S. see
250 [Vol. 22
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encouraging the implementation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES'
recommendation was to authorize the suspension of the
application to the losing party of concessions or obligations under
GATT 1947 by the complaining party, an action that required a
consensus of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.48
1. Pre-Tokyo Round
Initially, the text of Articles XXII and XXIII was all that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES of GATT 1947 had to guide them in the
resolution of their disputes.49 In fact, GATT 1947 did not even
define what a GATT 1947 dispute was. Because GATT 1947
lacked explicit guidelines, the procedures for resolving
international trade disputes evolved as custom when the
CONTRACTING PARTIES were forced to settle disputes among
themselves."
The basic dispute resolution procedure utilized under GATT
1947 was triggered if a contracting party believed that a benefit it
should have received under GATT 1947 was being nullified or
impaired by another contracting party. At that point, the
complaining party could initiate bilateral or multilateral
consultations.53  If the conflict was not resolved, through
consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES were charged with
investigating the dispute, reaching a conclusion by consensus, and
issuing a ruling or recommendation to resolve the dispute.14 If the
circumstances of the complaint were particularly egregious, the
Robert A. Bland, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990); John H. Jackson, The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade In United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249
(1967); and Thomas William France, Note, The Domestic Legal Status of GATT: The
Need For Clarification, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1481 (1994).
48 Mora, supra note 47, at 169 n.323. This sort of "retaliation" has only been used
once in the history of GATT. See Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations
To the United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953) (adopted).
49 Mora, supra note 47, at 115-17.
50 Id. at 115.
51 Id. at 118.
52 Id.
53 GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXII: 1-2, XXIII: 1-2, reprinted in ANALYTICAL
INDEX, supra note 5, at 586.
54 GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXIII, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra
note 5, at 586.
1996]
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CONTRACTING PARTIES had the option of deciding by consensus to
authorize retaliation against the offending contracting party."
All of the CONTRACTING PARTIES could not always be in
Geneva to hear disputes, and even if they were, it was difficult to
arrive at a consensus. Thus, smaller groups of contracting parties
were appointed to carry out this function.16 Working parties were
first used to lighten the load of the CONTRACTING. PARTIES.57
These groups of state representatives were directed to recommend
solutions consistent with GATT 1947 to disputes through
negotiation that could be enforced through adoption by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. 8 As the volume of complaints grew,
panels were established to hear and resolve CONTRACTING PARTY
disputes. 9 Even under the more streamlined dispute settlement
process, however, the establishment of a panel generally required a
consensus of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.60
Once a panel was established under GATT 1947, each
disputing party was allowed to present their position to the panel.6'
The panel then interpreted GATT 1947 as it applied to the measure
at issue and recommended a resolution.62  The panel's
recommendation did not, however, become effective until it was
adopted by a consensus of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 63  Even
though the final report could not be appealed, the only available
means of enforcing the panel's recommendation was through the
suspension of the application to the losing party of concessions or
55 GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXIII:2, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra
note 5, at 586. See also supra note 48.
56 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYsTEM 63 (1990).
57 ROBERT E. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 7 (1978).
58 Mora, supra note 47, at 118 n.63.
59 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 63 (1990).
60 The establishment of a panel was an action of the CONTRACTING PARTIES and
therefore generally required a consensus among them. See JOiN H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 123 (1969). This procedure was later formalized by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. See Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance of 28 November 1979, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 210 (1980) (adopted) [hereinafter Understanding of 1979].
61 ROBERT E. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 9 (1978).
62 Id. at 7-8.
63 Id. at 8.
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obligations under GATT 1947 by the complaining party.'
As the composition of the GATT 1947 membership became
more diverse, and the CONTRACTING PARTIES' consensus on basic
GATT 1947 principles eroded, the inadequacies of the dispute
resolution procedure were revealed.65  These deficiencies were
further emphasized as a period of lax enforcement in the 1960s
was followed by a period of increased dispute activity in the
1970s. 66
The problems inherent in the dispute resolution mechanisms
were laid painfully bare by the workings of the panel in the
Domestic International Sales Corporation dispute.67 It took over
three years for the disputing contracting parties to agree on the
composition of the panel and over five years for the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to adopt the recommendations of the panel.6 ' The DISC
Case and others like it brought about calls for reform of the defects
in the GATT 1947 dispute resolution system.69 These demands
helped to spur the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations."
2. The Tokyo Round
One of the most significant accomplishments of the Tokyo
Round was the codification of the existing informal dispute
61 GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXIII:2, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra
note 5, at 586. See also supra note 48.
65 See Mora, supra note 47, at 119.
66 See id. at 119-21.
67 United States Tax Legislation (DISC), GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 98 (1977)
(unadopted) (presented Nov. 12, 1976) [hereinafter DISC report]. For a discussion of
the DISC case, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM ch. 5 (1993); see also Robert E.
Hudec, Reforming GA TT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1457 (1988); John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International
Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978).
68 See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, ch. 5 (1993).
69 The formation of a panel was delayed for a year and a half in one panel. Robert
E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETII .G THE URUGUAY ROUND 182-.84 (Jeffrey E.
Schott, ed., 1990). In others the adoption of the panel report was delayed or blocked
entirely. Id.
70 See Declaration of Ministers, Sept. 4, 1973 GATT B.I.S.D. (20th Supp.) at 19
(1974) (adopted) (stating dispute resolution reform as a broad goal of the Tokyo
Round).
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resolution procedure in the "Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance"'"
and its Annex, the "Agreed Description of the Customary Practice
of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement."72
The Understanding of 1979, "[w]ith a view to improving and
refining the GATT [1947 dispute resolution] mechanism,"
provided a civil procedure of sorts for the CONTRACTING PARTIES
to utilize in adjudicating their disputes.73 The basic procedures
already in use, beginning with notification and consultations, were
reaffirmed without great elaboration.7 4 Other steps in the dispute
resolution process were, however, expanded in detail.75
Some of the most important provisions of the Understanding
of 1979 concern the time frames within which disputes were to be
settled. When a contracting party requested the establishment of a
panel under Article XXIII, the CONTRACTING PARTIES were
directed to grant the establishment of the panel only after the party
cited in the complaint had time to study and respond to the
complaint.76 Following the decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES
to establish a panel, the panel's members were to be nominated by
the Director-General and approved by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
"as promptly as possible," normally no later than thirty days after
the initial decision to establish the panel.77 The parties to the
dispute were then directed to respond to the nominations within a
short period of time, recommended to be seven working days, and
to not oppose the nominations unless they had compelling reasons
for doing so."
Once constituted, panels were urged to "deliver their findings
without undue delay," though it was cautioned that "[t]he time
71 Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) (adopted) [hereinafter
Understanding of 1979].
72 Id. Annex. Unlike Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, the Understanding
of 1979 and its Annex have an unclear legal status. Mora, supra note 47, at 123.
73 Understanding of 1979, supra note 71, para. 1.
74 Id. paras. 2-6.
75 Id. paras. 7-23.
76 Id. para. 10.
77 Id. para. 11.
78 Id. para. 12.
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required by panels will vary with the particular case."79 According
to the Annex, the function of a panel was "to review the facts of a
case and the applicability of GATT [ 1947] provisions and to arrive
at an objective assessment of these matters."' After the panel had
made their recommendations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES were
responsible for promptly considering the panel's report and taking
action within "a reasonable period of time."'"
If the recommendations of the CONTRACTING PARTIES were not
implemented within a "reasonable period of time," the contracting
party bringing the complaint was allowed to request that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES make "suitable efforts with a view to
finding an appropriate solution." 2 It was noted in the Annex that
the first objective of the CONTRACTING PARTIES should be to
83secure the withdrawal of any GATT 1947 inconsistent measures.
Failing this, compensation could be awarded, but only as a
temporary measure if the immediate withdrawal of the measures
was impracticable.8 4 The last resort of the CONTRACTING PARTIES
was be to be the authorization of suspension of the application of
concessions or obligations of the contracting party that failed to
withdraw the inconsistent measures by the complaining party. 5
3. Post-Tokyo Round
Use of the GATT 1947 dispute resolution mechanisms
increased dramatically after the implementation of the Tokyo
Round.86 Although this increase signaled a greater confidence in
the dispute resolution procedures, it also exposed lingering
deficiencies in the system. 7 Some of the most glaring problems
79 Id. para. 20.
80 Id. Annex, para. 3.
81 Id. para. 21.
82 Id. para. 22.
83 Id. Annex, para. 4.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Mora, supra note 47, at 125. For a discussion of how the GATT 1947 dispute
resolution mechanism worked during this period, see William J. Davey, Dispute
Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987); Rosine Plank, An Unofficial
Description of How a GA 7T Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 53 (1987).
87 Mora, supra note 47, at 127.
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included (1) delays in the formation of panels,88 (2) blockage of the
adoption of panel reports,89 and (3) noncompliance with the
recommendations of the panels."
These shortcomings were briefly addressed in a Ministerial
Declaration9 and a Decision92 of the CONTRACTING PARTIES which
reasserted the provisions of the Understanding of 1979, but failed
to adopt specific time limits or mechanisms for enforcement.
93
The need for further reform was apparent as the CONTRACTING
PARTIES embarked upon the Uruguay Round.94
B. Post- Uruguay Round Dispute Resolution
The Uruguay Round commenced in 1986 at Punta del Este
with the stated objective of strengthening the rules governing
panel procedure and increasing the enforcement of panel
decisions. 95  While the negotiations were in progress, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted the "Decision on Improvements to
the GATT [1947] Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures of 12
April 1989" 6  as a provisional procedure for dispute resolution
during the Uruguay Round negotiations. 97 The Decision of 1989
88 Id. at 127 n.104.
89 Id. at 127 n.107.
90 Id. at 127.
91 Ministerial Declaration, Dispute Settlement Procedures, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 13-16 (1983) (adopted).
92 Action Taken on 30 November, 1984, Dispute Settlement Procedures, Nov. 30,
1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 9 (1985) (adopted).
93 Mora, supra note 47, at 126.
94 See generally Robert E. Hudec, GA.TT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo
Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980) (calling for a
strengthened dispute resolution mechanism).
95 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1626 (1986). For a
discussion of proposed reforms, see Bliss, GATT Dispute Settlement Reform in the
Uruguay Round: Problems and Prospects, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31 (1987).
96 Decisions on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures, April 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1990) (adopted)
[hereinafter Decision of 1989].
97 The Decision of 1989 was applied on a trial basis from May 1, 1989 until the
end of the Uruguay Round. Id. at A.3. Its application was later extended until
implementation of the Final Act. Decision of 22 February 1994 on Extension of the
April 1989 Decision on Improvements to the GATT [1947] Dispute Settlement Rules
and Procedures, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE
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aimed to "ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes" by
discouraging delay and encouraging compliance.98 But again,
while the avoidance of delay was emphasized and time frames
were suggested, no specific requirements were set forth.99
After the Uruguay Round concluded' and the United States
had implemented the resulting trade agreements, 1 ' the resolution
of -disputes under GATT 1994 became, the responsibility of the
WTO.' 2 The WTO dispute resolution mechanism is administered
by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and governed by Article
XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as expanded by the DSU °3
The basic dispute settlement mechanism remains unchanged
from the pre-Uruguay period:"4 the complaining Member of the
WTO first seeks consultations, and if these consultations are
unsuccessful, the complaining Member may seek the
establishment of a panel1"5 to consider the dispute and recommend
a resolution.' 6 Under the DSU, however, the time frame of the
panel process is more tightly controlled. After a Member asks the
DSB to establish a panel, one is established automatically no later
than the next DSB meeting following the request, without a vote
of the DSB.'07At the request of the complaining Member, the DSB
can be convened within fifteen days of the request in order to
establish the panel more quickly.'8 The establishment of a panel
595 (1994).
98 Decision of 1989, supra note 96, para. A.3.
I ld. para. G.3, F.5.
100 The Uruguay Round was completed on December 15, 1993. Patterson &
Patterson, supra note 4, at 58 n.139.
101 The Final Act was implemented in the United States on December 8, 1994.
Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1994).
102 WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. III, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1145.
103 DSU, supra note 8, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). For a discussion of the draft version
of the DSU, see Mora, supra note 47, at 141-59 (1993); Patterson & Patterson, supra
note 4, at 35. The DSB was established by the WTO Agreement. WTO Agreement,
supra note 4, art. IV, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1145. It has the same composition as the
General Council. Id. The General Council is composed of representatives of all the
Members of the WTO. Id. art. IV, para. 2.
104 Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 497-85.
10 DSU, supra note 8, arts. 4-6, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-30.
106 Id. para. 11.1, 33 I.L.M. at 1233-34.
107 Id. para. 6.1, 33 I.L.M. at 1230.
108 Id. para. 6.1, n.5.
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can only be blocked by the vote of all of the Members of the DSB,
including the Member requesting the establishment of the panel.'9
Once established, the panel members who will hear the-dispute
are chosen."' The first step in this process is the nomination, by
the Secretariat, of the members of the panel."' The parties to the
dispute may oppose these nominations, but the DSU stipulates that
they should do so only "for compelling reasons.""2  If the
nominees are unopposed, they automatically become the panel
members."3 If they are opposed and the parties to the dispute
cannot agree on the panel composition within twenty days, at the
request of one of the parties, the Director-General may form the
panel by appointing the most appropriate members."
4
The timetable for the decision by the panel has also been
shortened. As a general rule, the period allowed for the
examination of the dispute by the panel, from the time the panel is
composed until the panel's final report is provided to the parties,
should not exceed six months"5 and in no case can the timetable
exceed nine months."6 The deadlines for specific actions by the
disputing Members and the panel must be set at the
commencement of the procedure in accordance with a proposed
timetable, which must comply with the overall time limitations."7
The DSU also makes it easier to adopt and implement a
panel's recommendations. Under the new system, a panel's final
report is automatically adopted by the DSB within sixty days of its
issuance, unless all of the Members of the DSB vote against its
adoption or one of the parties to the dispute notifies the DSB of its
decision to appeal the report."' If the report found a Member's
measure inconsistent with GATT 1994 and the report is not
109 Id. para. 6.1.
110 Id. art. 8, 33 I.L.M. at 1231-32.
11 Id. para. 8.6, 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
112 Id.
113 This conclusion is not explicitly stated in the DSU, but must be implied from it.
Id. art. 8, 33 I.L.M. at 1231-32.
114 Id. para. 8.7.
115 Id. para. 12.8, 33 I.L.M. at 1234.
116 Id. para. 12.9.
117 Id. app. 3, para. 12, 33 I.L.M. at 1246.
118 Id. para. 12.5, 33 I.L.M. at 1233.
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appealed, that Member " 9 is called upon to implement the
recommendations of the panel concerning the inconsistent
120
measure.
The opportunity to appeal "issues of law covered in the panel
report and the legal interpretation developed by the panel" to the
Appellate Body is the most noticeable departure from pre-Uruguay
Round procedure. 2' Any Member involved in the dispute may
commence an appeal by notifying the Appellate Body and filing a
Notice of Appeal with the Secretariat by the Appellant.' A
division of three Members of the Appellate Body will hear the
appeal.'23 These three will be chosen from the seven total
Members of the Appellate Body by rotation, "taking into account
the principles of random selection, unpredictability, and
opportunity for all Members to serve.' 24  As a general rule, the
appellate proceedings should not exceed sixty days, and in no case
can exceed ninety days.2 5 Once the Appellate Body has issued its
final report, it is adopted by the DSB within 30 days unless all the
DSB Members vote against it. 26 If a Member's measure is found
to be GATT 1994 inconsistent, the Member concerned is then
requested by the DSB to bring it into compliance with GATT
119 The DSU calls this party the "Member concerned." Id. para. 19.1, n.10, 33
I.L.M. at 1237.
120 Id. para. 19.1.
121 Id. para. 17.6, 33 I.L.M. at 1236-37. The Appellate Body is a seven member
standing body established by the DSB. Id. para. 17.1, 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The current
members are: Mr. James Bacchus of the United States, Mr. Christopher Beeby of New
Zealand, Professor Claus-Dieter Ehlermann of Germany, Dr. Said El-Naggar of Egypt,
Justice Florentino Feliciano of the Philippines, Mr. Julio Muro of Uruguay and
Professor Mitsuo Matsushita of Japan. The World Trade Organization, Press Release
File, Swearing-in ceremony of Appellate Body members completes institutional structure
of WTO-says Director General Renalto Ruggerio (visited Sept. 15, 1996)
<http:www.unicc.org/wto/welcome.html>. This body has adopted its own working
procedures. The World Trade Organization, Press Release File, World Trade
Organization Appellate Body adopts working procedures (visited Sept. 15, 1996)
<http:www.unicc.org/wto/welcome.html> [hereinafter Appellate Body Working
Procedures].
122 Appellate Body Working Procedures, supra note 121, para. 20(1). For a
description of what must be included in the notice of appeal, see id. para. 20(2).
123 Id. para. 6. 1.
124 Id. para. 6.2.
125 DSU, supra note 8, para. 17.5, 33 I.L.M. 1236 (1994); see also Appellate Body
Working Procedures, supra note 121, Annex I.
126 DSU, supra note 8, para. 17.4, 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
1996] 259
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
1994.1"7
If the Member concerned does not implement the
recommendations of the panel within a reasonable period of
time, 8 the parties to the dispute may enter into negotiations to
determine compensation for the Member who brought the
complaint.'29 If these negotiations are not successful within twenty
days after the expiration of a "reasonable time," the Member who
brought the dispute may request authorization from the DSB to
suspend the application of concessions or other obligations of the
Member concerned under any agreement administered by the
WTO.3 °
Even though GATT 1994 and the DSU are enforceable as a
treaty under international law, panel decisions are not binding
upon United States law. 3' GATT 1994 and the DSU are not self-
executing12  and, as emphasized in the DSU, the,
"[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish [Member's] rights and obligations under this
Understanding [and GATT 1994]."' In addition, the United
States' legislation implementing the agreements of the Uruguay
Round expressly provided that these agreements did not amend
United States' laws. 
134
Because GATT 1994 and the DSU are binding upon the
United States under international law only, the United States
retains the option of refusing to perform their obligations under
127 Id. para. 19.1, 33 I.L.M, at 1237.
128 A reasonable period of time may be: (1) a period of time proposed by the
Member concerned and approved by the DSB, (2) a period of time mutually acceptable
to the parties involved or (3) a period of time determined through binding arbitration
between the concerned parties not to exceed fifteen months unless the parties to the
dispute agree otherwise. Id. para. 21.3, 33 I.L.M. at 1238.
129 Id. para. 22.2, 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
130 Id.
131 Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1163; see also Dillon, supra note 7, at
390-91. Butsee Mora, supra note 47, at 169 n.323.
132 JEFFREY J. SCHorr, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 129 (1994). In
other words, the recommendations of a panel do not automatically become law in the
United States and the WTO cannot force the United States to alter their laws to meet the
recommendations. Id.
133 DSU, supra note 8, para. 3.2, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
134 Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1995).
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these agreements and violating international law.'35 In other
words, when a nation violates international law, "no police force
goes into action" to punish the violator.3 6 Once a WTO report is
adopted, therefore, the United States can choose how to respond.
The only means that the WTO has to enforce a panel's
recommendation is the authorization of retaliation, but even this
threat may not be too serious."' This option was available under
the dispute settlement procedures of GATT 1947 and was only
used once, with unsatisfactory results.' Even if this option is
utilized more often, only the European Union, Japan, and Canada
realistically have the economic strength to "unilaterally retaliate
against the United States."'39
There are, however, nonlegal incentives that could compel a
Member to comply with a WTO report. WTO officials have
stressed that a rejection of an adverse ruling by the United States
"would send a distinctly negative signal about. Washington's
future intentions toward the [WTO] ... .""' Some argue that the
consequences would be even greater; that the "defiance of an
important treaty ... risks precipitating a chain reaction leading to a
more general collapse of the cooperative structure.
' 14 1
Thus it appeared that the DSU had the potential to direct the
WTO to resolve disputes under GATT 1994 and to enforce their
reports more efficiently without encroaching impermissibly upon
the sovereignty of its Members. The promising new dispute
resolution mechanism of the DSU was first tested by the complaint
135 Gary N. Horlick, Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Will the United States Play by
the Rules,? in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT 691
(1995); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 865 (1995).
136 Shell, supra note 135, at 865 n.171.
137 Horlick, supra note 135, at 691.
138 See supra note 48.
139 Horlick, supra note 135, at 691 (quoting The General Agreement for Tariffs
and Trade: Uruguay Round Should Produce Overall U.S. Economic Gains, U.S.
General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 1994, at 45). Or, as an editorial in the
Saint Louis Dispatch phrased it, "[w]hy pick a fight with your biggest trade partner."
Editorial, ST Louis POST DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 1996, at 6B.
1' U.S. Rejection of Gasoline Ruling Would Send Negative Signal, WTO Officials
Say, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No.13, at A-13 (Jan. 22, 1996).
4' Shell, supra note 135, at 900 n.329.
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brought by Venezuela and Brazil against the United States
concerning an EPA gasoline regulation. The resolution of this
dispute provided the first opportunity to evaluate the DSU.
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Congress enacted the CAA in 1955 to prevent and control air
pollution in the United States. 42 The CAA was then amended in
1990 in order to improve air quality in the most polluted areas of
the United States.'43 The amended CAA required that future
pollution from gasoline combustion in the U.S. not exceed 1990
levels and called for a reduction of pollution levels in major
population areas.'44
The CAA first aimed at reducing pollution in nonattainment
areas, the areas in the U.S. that had the highest levels of
summertime ozone pollution.145  In these areas, only
reformulated'46 gasoline could be sold to consumers. 47  Certain
compositional and performance specifications were established by
the CAA for reformulated gasoline.
48
In all areas of the U.S. not covered by the first program,
conventional' 49 gasoline could be sold to consumers. In order to
142 Pub. L. No. 88-206 § 1, 77 Stat. 392, ch. 360, tit. I § 101 (1955) (prior to
amendments).
141 Clean Air Amendment of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
145 Id. § 7545(k)(10)(d). Additional areas could be classified as "nonattainment
area[s]" at the request of their state governors. Id. § 7545(k)(5)(A).
1' Reformulated gasoline is "any gasoline whose formulation has been certified
under § 80.40, which meets each of the standards and requirements prescribed under §
80.41, and which contains less than the maximum concentration of the marker specified
in § 80.82 that is allowed for reformulated gasoline under § 80.82." Gasoline Rule,
supra note 20, § 80.2(ee).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(5).
148 Id. § 7545(k)(2). The oxygen content of reformulated gasoline must be less than
2.0% by weight, the benzene content must not exceed 1.0% by volume, the gasoline
must be free of heavy metals including lead and manganese, the emissions of volatile
organic compounds and toxic air pollutants must be reduced, and the emissions of
nitrogen oxides must not be increased. Id.
141 Conventional gasoline is "gasoline which has not been certified under § 80.40."
Gasoline Rule, supra note 20, § 80.2(ff).
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prevent the dumping of pollutants extracted from reformulated
gasoline in compliance with the first program into conventional
gasoline, the CAA mandated that all conventional gasoline sold by
domestic refiners, blenders, and importers remain as clean as
gasoline was in 19905"
The EPA was charged by Congress with implementing both of
these programs."' In 1991, the EPA promulgated the Regulation
of Fuels and Fuel Additives as the means by which compliance
with the CAA would be determined.'52 For reformulated gasoline,
domestic refiners, blenders and importers were required to meet
certain fixed specifications53 and comply with certain non-
degradation requirements.154 Compliance with the non-degradation
requirements was measured on an average annual basis, by
comparing certain qualities in current reformulated gasoline 55 with
the qualities found in gasoline in 1990.156 For conventional
gasoline, compliance was also measured on an annual basis by
comparing all qualities of current conventional gasoline with
gasoline in 1990.1"
For both reformulated and conventional gasoline, therefore, the
method by which the quality of gasoline in 1990 was measured
was of great importance. Under the Gasoline Rule, the quality of
gasoline in 1990, that is, the quality which the producer was
required to achieve, was designated as the 1990 baseline levels. 58
Two different types of baselines levels could be used by a refiner,
blender, or importer to compare its current levels: (1) an individual
baseline established by the refiner, blender, or importer based
150 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8).
151 Id. § 7545(k)(1).
152 Gasoline Rule, supra note 20.
153 Id. § 80.42. These specifications concern Reid Vapor Pressure, oxygen, benzene
and toxics performance. Id. § 80.42. The period in which these specifications must be
met is January 1, 1995 through January 1, 1998. Id. § 80.42(c)(2). At the expiration of
this period, different specifications will be required. Id. § 80.45. These later
specifications are not at issue in this dispute.
154 Id. § 80.42. These requirements concern sulfur, olefins and T-90 qualities. Id.
155 Specifically by comparing the qualities of sulfur, olefins and T-90. Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. §§ 80.90-.91.
158 Id. §§ 80.90-.93.
1996] 263
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 22
upon the quality of the gasoline actually sold by this particular
producer in 1990;' or (2) a statutory baseline established by the
EPA based upon the average quality of all producers of gasoline in
the U.S. in 1990.16°
Which baseline a producer was required to use depended upon
whether the producer was a refiner, blender, or importer.161 Any
domestic refiner that was in operation for at least six months in
1990 was required to establish an individual baseline.'62 In
contrast, domestic refiners that were not in operation in 1990, or
were in operation for less than six months in 1990, were required
to use the statutory baseline.163 If they had the specified amount
and type of data from 1990, blenders could establish an individual
baseline,'6M otherwise, they were also required to use the statutory
baseline. 165  Similarly, importers could establish an individual
baseline if they had the requisite data, 166 but were required to use
the statutory baseline if their data was incomplete. 167  Importers
were not, however, allowed to establish individual baselines for
the foreign refiners from which their gasoline originated. 1
68
159 Id. § 80.91(c)(1)-(3).
160 Id. § 80.91(c)(5). The statutory baseline is a complex set of requirements
concerning the fuel parameter values, API gravity, and emissions values of the gasoline.
Id.
161 Id. § 80.91(b).
162 Id. § 80.91(a). Three methods are used to establish the domestic refiner's
individual baseline. Id. § 80.91. If the quality data and volume records of the refiner for
1990 are available, they are used to establish the individual baseline. Id. § 80.91(c)(1)
(Method 1). If this data is not available, the refiner must establish its individual baseline
based upon its 1990 gasoline blendstock quality data and 1990 blendstock production
records. Id. § 80.91(c)(2) (Method 2). If this data is also not available, the refiner must
base its individual baseline on its post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/or gasoline quality
data modeled in light of refinery changes to reflect the 1990 gasoline composition. Id. §
80.9 1(c)(3) (Method 3).
163 Id. § 80.91(b)(1); see supra note 160.
j64 Id. § 80.91(b)(3). Blenders must have the data used by domestic refiners under
Method 1 in order to establish an individual baseline. See supra note 163.
165 Gasoline Rule, supra note 20' § 80.91(b)(3). Blenders therefore do not have the
opportunity to use Method 2 or Method 3 used by domestic refiners. See supra note
163.
166 Gasoline Rule, supra note 20, § 80.91(b)(4). Again, they would need the
information required under Method 1 for domestic refiners. See supra note 163.
167 Gasoline Rule, supra note 20, at § 80.91(b)(4). Again, importers do not have
the opportunity to use Method 2 or 3 used by domestic refiners. See supra note 163.
168 Gasoline Rule supra note 20, § 80.91(b)(4). The possibility of allowing the
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B. Consultation Request and Establishment of the Panel
The dispute in the WTO concerning the Gasoline Rule began
in 1994 under GATT 1947 with the failure of bilateral
consultations between Venezuela and the United States. 69 Because
the United States did not oppose the request by Venezuela for the
formation of a panel to consider this issue, one was established. "0
Before the Panel could address the consistency of the Gasoline
Rule with GATT 1947, however, Venezuela withdrew its
complaint so it could reinstate it under the new WTO dispute
settlement procedure. 1
In early 1995 Venezuela again asked the United States to
participate in consultations concerning the Gasoline Rule, this
time under the DSU.'72 Venezuela claimed that the Gasoline Rule
violated Article 11I:4 of GATT 1994 because it treated foreign
products "less favorably" than "like" domestic products and that it
was not justified under Article XX as being "necessary" to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health; "necessary" to enforce a law
that is consistent with GATT 1994, or "relating to" natural
resource conservation. 17  When these consultations failed to
produce an acceptable resolution of the dispute, Venezuela
requested the DSB"74 to establish a dispute settlement panel to
establishment of individual baselines for foreign refiners was examined by the EPA in
the process of drafting the Gasoline Rule. U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17,
para. 2.13. In fact, in May 1994, the EPA proposed the limited use of individual
baselines by foreign refiners for use in determining compliance with the reformulated
gasoline program. 59 Fed. Reg. 22,800, May 3, 1994. This proposal, however, never
entered into force and the funding necessary for its implementation was later denied by
Congress. U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 2.13.
169 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GATT ACTIVITIES: 1994-1995 48 (1996).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 1.1.
171 Id. para. 3.1. Venezuela also claimed that the Gasoline Rule nullified and
impaired benefits under Article XXIII: 1 (b) of GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XXIII: 1 (b)
(GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XXIII: I, reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5,
at 518), and violated Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
Marakesh Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Annex 1 A, Apr.
14, 1994, reprinted in GATT: MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE URUGUAY
ROUND (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note
17, paras. 3.1-3.2.
'14 The DSB was established by the WTO Agreement. WTO Agreement, supra
note 4, art. IV, para. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1145. It has the same composition as the. General
Council. Id. The General Council is composed of representatives of all the Members of
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determine whether the Gasoline Rule unjustifiably violated GATT
1994.175 On April 10, 1995, the DSB established a Panel to
consider the issue raised by Venezuela and Venezuela and the
United States agreed upon the Panel's composition.'76
On the same day, Brazil initiated consultations under GATT
1994 with the United States concerning similar complaints about
the Gasoline Rule.' These consultations were also unsuccessful
and were followed by a request by Brazil to the DSB to establish a
panel to consider the complaint against the United States.'78 With
the agreement of Venezuela, Brazil, and the United States, the
DSB decided that the Panel established at Venezuela's request
would also examine the matters brought forth by Brazil.79
C. The U.S. Gasoline Panel Report
1. Issues and Holdings
Once established, the U.S. Gasoline Panel examined the issue
of whether the Gasoline Rule was unjustifiably in violation of
GATT 1994. The specific questions considered by the Panel were
whether, under the Gasoline Rule, reformulated gasoline imported
from Venezuela and Brazil was treated "less favorably" than "like"
domestic reformulated gasoline, in violation of Article 111:4 of
GATT 1994, and, if so, whether this difference in treatment was
justified under the domestic policy exceptions found in Article
XX(b), (d), or (g) of GATT 1994.180 In the U.S. Gasoline Report
the Panel found that the Gasoline Rule did unjustifiably violate
GATT 1994.181
the WTO. Id. art. IV, para. 2.
'7 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 1.1.
176 Id. para. 1.1. The parties also agreed that the Chairman of the Panel would be
Mr. Joseph Wong and the Members would be Mr. Crawford Falconer and Mr. Kim
Luotone. Id. para. 1.1.
171 Id. paras. 1.1, 3.1. Brazil, however, did not contend that nullification and
impairment had occurred under Article XXIII: 1(b). Id. para. 3.2.
178 Id.
179 Id. para. 1.3.
180 Id. para. 3.1.
181 Id. paras. 8.1-8.2.
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2. The Panel's Reasoning
In reaching this conclusion, the U.S. Gasoline Panel first
considered whether the Gasoline Rule violated the national
treatment requirements of Article 111:4 of GATT 1994.182 Under
Article 111:4, laws must afford "no less favorable" treatment to
imported products than they do to "like" domestic products. 83
Because the parties agreed that the Gasoline Rule was a regulation
affecting imported products,' the main considerations were
whether imported reformulated gasoline and domestic
reformulated gasoline were "like" products, and, if so, whether
imported reformulated gasoline was afforded "less favorable"
treatment than domestic reformulated gasoline.'85
The U.S. Gasoline Panel first considered whether imported and
domestic reformulated gasoline were "like" products.'86 The Panel
rejected the argument of the United States that the situation of the
producer should be taken into consideration when determining the
similarity of products.8 7  Noting that "chemically-identical
imported and domestic gasoline by definition have exactly the
same physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff classification and are
perfectly substitutable," the Panel interpreted the term "like"
literally, finding that "chemically-identical imported and domestic
gasoline are like products under Article I11:4.
'9188
The Panel then considered whether imported reformulated
gasoline was treated "less favorably" than domestic reformulated
gasoline under the Gasoline Rule.8 9 Explaining that a batch of
imported reformulated gasoline could fail to meet its statutory
baseline even though it was chemically-identical to a batch of
domestic reformulated gasoline that met its individual baseline,
182 Id. paras. 6.5-6.16. For the relevant text of Article 111:4 see supra note 283.
183 GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. 111:4 (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. 111:4,
reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 115).
184 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 6.5.
185 Id. paras. 6.6-6.9.
186 Id. para. 6.9.
187 Id. The United States argued that products from similarly situated producers
were "like." Id. para. 6.6.
188 Id. para. 6.9. The U.S. Gasoline Panel determined that chemically-identical
products are like regardless of the situation of their producers. Id.
189 Id. paras. 6.10-6.16.
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the Panel observed that "domestic gasoline benefitted [sic] in
general" because an individual baseline applied to it instead of the
statutory baseline that applied to foreign gasoline. 9° As a result,
the Gasoline Rule did not afford "effective equality of
opportunity" to imported reformulated gasoline because "imported
gasoline was effectively prevented from benefiting from as
favorable sales conditions as were afforded domestic gasoline."'1 9'
The U.S. Gasoline Panel did not accept the arguments made by
the United States that different treatment was not equivalent to
"less favorable" treatment.' 92 The Panel first rejected the United
States argument that even though chemically-identical imported
and domestic reformulated gasoline were treated differently by the
Gasoline Rule, the Rule treated "similarly situated" foreign and
domestic producers equally.' 93 The Panel based their decision on
the fact that the focus of Article 111:4 is "less favorable" treatment
of "like" products, not producers. 94 The Panel also feared that
such a rule would lead to "great instability and uncertainty in the
conditions of competition ... between domestic and foreign goods
in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with Article III:4" because
imported goods could "be exposed to a highly subjective and
variable treatment according to extraneous factors."' '95 In addition,
it was noted that such an approach would necessitate comparisons
of "identifiable" foreign and domestic producers, a determination
that the Panel deemed could be based upon "no inherently
objective criteria."' 96
The Panel utilized similar reasoning to reject the argument that
190 Id. para. 6.10. This would occur if a domestic producer had 1990 gasoline
quality data that resulted in an individual baseline that was lower than the statutory
baseline. Id.
191 Id. (quoting United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 report, Nov. 7,
1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, para. 5.11. (1990) (adopted) [hereinafter U.S.
337 panel report]). For discussion of the U.S. 337 panel report see infra notes 298-302
and accompanying text.
192 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, paras. 6.11-6.15.
193 Id. paras. 6.11-6.13.
194 Id. para. 6.11 (following U.S. Alcohol panel report, supra note 47, para. 5.19).
For discussion of the U.S. Alcohol panel report see infra notes 288-297 and
accompanying text.
195 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 6.12.
196 Id. para. 6.13.
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treatment of imported reformulated gasoline was "on the whole"
"no less favorable" than domestic reformulated gasoline. 97 If "less
favorable" treatment in one instance against one Member could be
balanced against more favorable treatment in another instance
against the same Member, "less favorable" treatment of one
Member could be balanced against more favorable treatment of
another Member. 8 Such a result would "lead to great uncertainty
about the conditions of competition between imported and
domestic products and thus defeat the purpose of Article III:4."' 99
Even if the United States argument was accepted, the Panel
cautioned that under the Gasoline Rule "as a whole" foreign
producers were treated "less favorably than domestic producers
because importers had to adapt to an assigned average standard not
linked to the particular gasoline imported, when . . . . domestic
gasoline had only to meet a standard linked to their own product .
S. .9100 As a result, the Panel found that the Gasoline Rule treated
"like" imported reformulated gasoline "less favorably" than
domestic reformulated gasoline, and thus concluded that the
Gasoline Rule violated Article 111:4 of GATT 1994.0'
Having determined that the Gasoline Rule was inconsistent
with Article 111:4, the Panel then considered whether this
inconsistency was justified under Article XX(b), (d) or (g) of
GATT 1994.202 Article XX(b) justifies the violation of GATT
1994 by measures that "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health.""2 3 Venezuela, Brazil, and the United States
agreed that the policy to reduce air pollution caused by the use of
gasoline was a policy concerning the protection of "human, animal
197 Id. paras. 6.14-6.15.
198 Id. para. 6.14 (following U.S. 337 panel report, supra note 191, para. 5.14).
199 Id. (following U.S. 337 panel report, supra note 191, para. 5.14).
200 Id. para. 6.15.
201 Id. para. 6.16. Because the Panel held that under Article III:4 the Gasoline Rule
violated GATT 1994, they did not consider whether it also violated Article III:1 and
Article 1: 1. Id. para. 6.17.
202 Id. paras. 6.20-6.41. For the relevant text of Article XX, see supra note 304.
203 GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XX(b),
reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518). The burden of proving the
requirements of this exception falls on the party invoking it. U.S. Gasoline Panel
Report, supra note 17, para. 6.20.
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or plant life or health." ' 4
As a result, the Panel had to consider whether it was
"necessary", for "imported gasoline [to] be effectively prevented
from benefiting from as favorable sales conditions as were
afforded by an individual baseline tied to the producers of a
product.""2 5  In order to be "necessary" the Panel held that a
measure must have no available "alternative measure which could
reasonably be employed and which is not inconsistent with other
GATT [1994] provisions . . .,206 or is "less inconsistent with""2 7
GATT 1994 than the measure at issue.2 8
Examining "whether there were measures consistent or less
inconsistent with [GATT 1994] that were reasonably available to
the U.S. to further its policy objective of protecting human, animal
and plant life or health," the Panel noted that the U.S. could have
allowed foreign producers to apply individual baselines or could
have applied the statutory baseline to both domestic and foreign
producers. 209 Because the U.S. failed to show that it was not
feasible to apply individual baselines to foreign gasoline,210 the
Panel found that this GATT 1994-consistent alternative was
available to the U.S., making the Gasoline Rule unnecessary.2 1 1
The Panel therefore found that the Gasoline Rule was not justified
under GATT 1994 by Article XX(b).212
204 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 6.21.
205 Id. para. 6.22.
206 Id. para. 6.24 (following U.S. 337 panel report, supra note 191, para. 5.26).
207 Id. para. 6.24 (quoting Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, para.
75 (1991) (adopted) [hereinafter Thai Cigarette panel report]). For a discussion of the
Thai Cigarette panel report see infra notes 310-312.
208 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 6.24.
209 Id. para. 6.25.
210 Id. para. 6.24.
211 Id. para. 6.28. The Panel found that inconsistent treatment of imported
reformulated gasoline was unnecessary because the United States failed to show why it
was not feasible for foreign producers of reformulated gasoline to use individual
baselines, Id. para. 6.26; the United States' concern that "gaming" would occur was not
justified, Id. para. 6.27; and the United States had failed to show that there was no less
inconsistent measure reasonably available to enforce compliance with the baseline
requirements, Id. para. 6.28.
212 Id. Because it had already concluded that the Gasoline Rule did not meet the
second requirement of Article XX(b), the Panel did not consider whether the Gasoline
Rule was "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
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The Panel also found that the Gasoline Rule was not justified
by Article XX(d), which allows a measure otherwise in violation
of GATT 1994 to be enforced if it is "necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with [GATT 1994]. "213 The Panel noted that the baseline
establishment rules "were simply rules for determining...
individual baselines" and "were not an enforcement
mechanism. 2 14 Based on this finding, the Panel reasoned that the
Gasoline Rule did not actually have the effect of "securing
compliance" with the baseline system of the CAA and therefore
was not justified under Article XX(d) as a measure necessary "to
secure compliance with" a GATT 1994 consistent law.
215
Lastly, the Panel considered whether the Gasoline Rule was
justified under the Article XX(g) exception for measures "relating
to the conservation of exhaustible resources made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production., 216  The
Panel first agreed with the United States that clean air was an
"exhaustible natural resource." '217 Noting that "the purposes of..
. Article XX(g) was not to widen the scope of measures serving
trade policy purposes, but merely to ensure that the [GATT 1994]
commitments do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the
conservation of natural resources," the Panel interpreted the phrase
"relating to" conservation as meaning "primarily aimed at"
conservation. 218 The Panel then observed that there was "no direct
connection between less favorable treatment of [like] imported
gasoline . . . and the U.S. objective of improving air quality in
consumption" or whether the Gasoline Rule met the requirements of the introductory
clause of Article XX. Id. para. 6.29.
213 Id. paras. 6.30-6.34. The burden of proving the requirements of this exception
falls on the party invoking it. Id. para. 6.30.
214 Id. para. 6.33.
215 Id. para. 6.33. Because it had already concluded that the Gasoline Rule did not
meet the first requirement under Article XX(d), the Panel did not consider whether the
Gasoline Rule was "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption" or whether the Gasoline Rule met the requirements of the
introductory clause of Article XX. Id. paras. 6.41-6.42.
216 Id. paras. 6.35-6.41. The burden of proving the requirements of this exception
falls on the party invoking it. Id. para. 6.35.
217 Id. paras. 6.36-6.37.
218 Id. para. 6.39. That is, the regulation must be more than just associated with the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
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the United States." '219 The Panel therefore determined that the
Gasoline Rule was not justified under Article XX(g).220
Because the Gasoline Rule did not comply with Article 11I:4 of
GATT 1994 and was not justified by the exceptions in Article
XX(b), (d) or (g) of GATT 1994,21 the U.S. Gasoline Panel
determined that the Gasoline Rule was in violation of GATT 1994
and recommended that the United States bring the Gasoline Rule
into conformity.22
D. Request for An Appeal
Following the Panel's decision, the United States promptly
gave notice to the DSB that it wished to appeal certain issues of
law and legal interpretations of the Panel Report.223 The United
States automatically commenced the appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal and an Appellant's submission with the Appellate Body.
2 4
In response to this action, Brazil and Venezuela then filed their
Appellants' submissions. 5 The composition of the 3 member
Appellate Body was chosen from the seven members of the
Appellate Body using the principles of "random selection,
unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to serve." 
26
219 Id. para. 6.40. Again, the regulation requiring reformulated gasoline to meet a
baseline would be primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
220 Id. Because it had already determined that the Gasoline Rule did not meet the
second requirement of Article XX(g), the Panel did not consider whether the Gasoline
Rule was made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption or whether the Gasoline Rule met the requirements of the introductory
clause of Article XX. Id. para. 6.41.
221 Because it had reached these conclusions, the Panel did not consider whether the
Gasoline Rule also violated Article XXIII: 1(b) of GATT 1994 or the TBT Agreement.
Id. paras. 6.42-6.43.
222 Id. paras. 8.1-8.2. The Panel stressed that they were not judging the merits of
the objectives of the Clean Air Act or the Gasoline Rule, but instead were merely
considering the methods of implementing this law. Id. para. 7.1.
223 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 1, 2.
224 Id. at 2.
225 Id.
226 See Appellate Body Working Procedures, supra note 121, art. 6. The division
that was chosen was led by Justice Florentino Feliciano, the Presiding Member, and
included Mr. Christopher Beeby and Professor Milsuo Matsushito as Members. U.S.
Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 1.
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E. The U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report
1. Issues and Holdings
The sole issue raised by the United States in their appeal was
whether under Article XX(g) of GATT 1994, the baseline
establishment rules contained in the Gasoline Rule were justified
as measures "relating to the'conservation of natural resources
. made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production." '227 The Appellate Body first had to determine whether
the Panel had wrongly decided that the baseline establishment
rules did not "relate to" the conservation of clean air.22 If the
Appellate Body found that the Panel's holding was erroneous, they
then had to consider whether the baseline establishment rules
satisfied the other requirement of Article XX(g)--that the baseline
establishment rules were made "in conjunction with" domestic
restrictions-and the introductory provisions of Article XX-that
forbid "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discrimination and
"disguised" restrictions of international trade. 9 In its Report, the
Appellate Body concluded that the baseline establishment rules
were not justified under Article XX(g) of GATT 1994.230
2. The Appellate Body's Reasoning
In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Body first defined
the measure that was at issue in this dispute.231 In applying Article
XX(g), the Panel had used several different terms interchangeably
227 Id. at 5.
228 Id. at 5. For the relevant text of the Article XX(g) see supra note 304.
229 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 6. For the relevant text
of the preamble of Article XX see supra note 304. Venezuela and Brazil had also
requested that the Appellate Body consider, if they found that the baseline establishment
rules were justified as a measure related to conservation made effective in conjunction
with domestic restrictions, whether clean air was a "natural resource" as required by
Article XX(g); and, if the Appellate Body found that it was a natural resource, whether
the baseline establishment rules violated the TBT Agreement. U.S. Gasoline Appellate
Body Report, supra note 18, at 6-7. The Appellate Body, however, declined to consider
these issues because they had not been raised properly in accordance with the Working
Procedures. Id. at 7-8.
230 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 20-21.
231 Id. at 9.
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as the measures.232 The Appellate Body noted, however, that
throughout the U.S. Gasoline Panel's analysis, only the substance
of the baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule was
evaluated as the measure at issue, not the entire Gasoline Rule.233
The Appellate Body also mentioned that it had been the practice of
earlier panels to only apply Article XX to the provisions that were
found to be inconsistent with another article of GATT.234 Based
upon the actual use of the baseline establishment rules by the
Panel and the practice of earlier panels, the Appellate Body
defined the measure at issue in this appeal as simply the baseline
establishment rules, not any other portions of the Gasoline Rule.235
The Appellate Body next proceeded to review the Panel's
analysis of the baseline establishment rules under Article XX(g).236
Criticizing the "opaqueness" of the Panel Report's analysis, the
Appellate Body evaluated the Panel's conclusions concerning the
"relating to" requirement of Article XX(g).237 The Appellate Body
first determined that the Panel had incorrectly analyzed whether
the "less favorable" treatment of imported gasoline was "related
to" the conservation of clean air, when it should have instead
considered whether the baseline establishment rules themselves
were "related to" conservation.23
Next, interpreting how the requirement of "relating to" the
conservation of natural resources would be met,239 the Appellate
Body noted that a general rule of treaty interpretation is that "[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose."240  The phrase
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 9-13.
237 Id. at 10-13.
238 Id. at 11.
239 Id. 11-13.
240 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31,
para.13(b), reprinted in BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS 402 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. This rule was relied upon by all of the parties to this dispute and has
attained the status of a customary international law that the Appellate Body must apply
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"relating to,"2 4 as understood by the Appellate Body, appears in
the context of several other descriptions of relationships between
measures and their policies in Article XX, e.g., "necessary, '242
"essential, 243 "for the protection of, 2" "in pursuance of, 2 45 and
"involving."
246
Because Article XX(g) must be understood in the context of
the objectives and purposes of GATT 1994,247 the Appellate Body
held that the Panel had erroneously applied the test of whether the
baseline establishment rules were "necessary," a test that was not
required by the text of Article XX(g).2 4s  The proper test,
according to the Appellate Body, was that the meaning of the
phrase "relating to" must be decided on a "case-by-case basis by
careful scrutiny of the factual and legal context in a given dispute,
with ... [careful regard for] the words actually used by the WTO
Members to express their intent and purpose. 249
in interpreting the provisions of GATT 1994. U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report,
supra note 18, at 11-12; see also DSU, supra note 8, para. 3.2, 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
241 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 12. The phrase
"relating to" also appears in other paragraphs of Article XX. Id.; see GATT 1994,
supra note 5, art. XX(c), (e) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(c), (e):4, reprinted in
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
242 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 12; see GATT 1994,
supra note 5, art. XX(a), (b), (d) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(a), (b), (d),
reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
243 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 12; see GATT 1994,
supra note 5, art. XX(j) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(j), reprinted in ANALYTICAL
INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
244 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 12; see GATT 1994,
supra note 5, art. XX(f) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(f), reprinted in
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
245 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 12; see GATT 1994,
supra note 5, art. XX(h) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(h), reprinted in
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
246 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 12; see GATT 1994,
supra note 5, art. XX(i) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(i), reprinted in ANALYTICAL
INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
247 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 12.
248 Id.
249 Id. The Appellate Body sanctioned the view that "the purpose of including
Article XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures
serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the
General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources." Id. (citing the U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note
17, para. 6.39 (citing Canada Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98, para. 4.6 (1989) (adopted)
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The Appellate Body next analyzed whether, under Article
XX(g), the baseline establishment rules were "related to" the
conservation of clean air.25 The Appellate Body noted that the
baseline establishment rules were designed to measure the
compliance of domestic refiners, blenders, and importers with the
non-degradation requirements of the CAA.25'. Without a baseline
to monitor compliance, the Gasoline Rule's objective of
conserving clean air would be "substantially frustrated.,
25 2
Because there was therefore a "substantial relationship" between
the baseline establishment rules and the policy of conservation, the
Appellate Body determined that the baseline establishment rules
met the requirements of Article XX(g).253
Having rejected the Panel's conclusions concerning whether
the baseline establishment rules "related to" the conservation of
clean air, the Appellate Body had to further consider whether the
rules met the requirements of Article XX(g) that were not
considered in the Panel's Report.254 Specifically, the Appellate
Body had to address whether the baseline establishment rules were
"made in conjunction with" restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.255
Interpreting the meaning of this phrase, the Appellate Body
concluded that it was "a requirement of even-handedness in the
imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the
production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources..256
[hereinafter Canada Herring and Salmon panel report]). For a discussion of the Canada
Herring and Salmon panel report, see infra notes 325-333.
250 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 13. The Appellate
Body did point out that the phrase "primarily aimed at" is not treaty language and is not
a simple litmus test for the application of Article XX(g). Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 13-15.
255 Id.; see GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(g) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art.
XX(g), reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
256 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 14. The Appellate
Body again referred to the general rule of interpretation found in the Vienna
Convention. Id. (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 240). The Body also cautioned
that identical treatment was not required, indeed it would be impossible, for if the
measure treated domestic and foreign product identically, it would not violate any of the
other GATT 1994 provisions. U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at
14.
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Because the baseline establishment rules "affect both domestic and
imported gasoline," and because "restrictions on the consumption
or depletion of clean air by regulating the domestic production of
'dirty' gasoline are established jointly with corresponding
restrictions with respect to imported gasoline," the Appellate Body
held that the baseline establishment rules were "related to"
conservation under Article XX(g).
217
The analysis of a measure under Article XX is "two-tiered" in
that a measure must not only meet the requirements of the
particular exception of Article XX(g), but it must also comply with
the preamble of Article XX.2 11 Specifically, under the preamble a
measure must not "be applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or where there, is a
disguised restriction on international trade., 259  According to the
Appellate Body, these prohibitions must be read "side-by-side" in
a manner that does not "reduce ...whole clauses of [GATT
1994] to redundancy or inutility.""26
In considering whether the baseline establishment rules were
consistent with the preamble to Article XX, the Appellate Body
asserted that there were several alternatives available to the United
States in promulgating the baseline establishment rules to ensure
compliance with the CAA. 6' Most simply, the United States could
have made the statutory baseline applicable to both domestic and
foreign refiners.262 This option was rejected by the United States
because it would have been too costly for domestic refiners.263
Alternatively, the United States could have allowed foreign
257 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 14-15. The Appellate
Body also noted that the less favorable treatment of foreign gasoline was not material
and that there is no requirement that a measure must actually result in the conservation
of the natural resource. Id. at 15.
258 Id. The burden of proof for the preamble falls on the shoulders of the party
claiming the exception and is heavier than the burden faced in showing that a measure
fits into paragraph (g). Id. at 16.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 16-17.
261 Id. at 17-20.
262 Id. at 19-20.
263 Id.
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refiners to establish individual baselines.2 ' This option was also
dismissed by the United States because of the presumed difficulty
of data verification and enforcement in foreign countries.265
In the Appellate Body's estimation, the United States therefore
failed to "explore adequate means, including in particular
cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of
mitigating the administrative problems relied on justification by
the U.S. for rejecting individual baselines for foreign [production];
and to count the costs for foreign [production] that would result
from the imposition of statutory baselines., 266 Because the United
States foresaw that the baseline establishment rules would be
disadvantageous for foreign refiners, the Appellate Body
concluded that the application of the baseline establishment rules
constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and was a "disguised
restriction on international trade," such that the justifying
protection afforded by Article XX did not apply. 67
Thus, even though the Appellate Body held that the Panel
erroneously failed to find that the baseline establishment rules met
the requirements of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body declined to
apply the protection of Article XX to the baseline establishment
rules because they did not come within the requirements of the
Article XX preamble..26  The legal findings of the Panel's Report
were therefore modified to reflect the Appellate Body's
conclusions.269 In addition, the Appellate Body recommended that
the DSB request the United States to bring the baseline
establishment rules into conformity with GATT 1994.27o
In determining that the Gasoline Rule violated Article II1:4 and
was not justified by Article XX(b), (d) or (g), both the Panel and
Appellate Body chose to follow the analyses put forward by
previous panels for the determination of whether measures
unjustifiably violated GATT 1947. By examining these past panel
264 Id. at 17-19.
261 Id. at 18.
266 Id. at 17-20.
267 Id. at 20.
268 Id. at 9-20.
269 Id. at 20.
270 Id. at 21.
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reports, the Panel and Appellate Body Reports may be more easily
understood.
IV. Background Law II: Article 111:4 and Article XX(b), (d),
and (g)
When considering past panel decisions under GATT 1947, it is
important to note that GATT 1994 jurisprudence differs notably
from that of the United States' legal system.271 One of the most
significant differences is that "under accepted doctrines of
international law, stare decisis, the common law concept of
'precedent,' does not apply. 272 As a result, only the disputants are
bound by a panel decision.2 73  GATT 1994 panels and the
Appellate Body are not bound to follow the interpretations or
applications of GATT 1947 made by previous panels. 2 74 In fact,
reliance upon past panel reports has been partially discouraged
because these panels were not required to explain their analysis or
conclusions, thus their reports were vague and difficult to apply in
other factual situations.275 Panels in some cases therefore have
declined to follow previous panel applications of legal rules to
facts. 27
6
Previous panel interpretations are, however, been mentioned in
detail in many panel reports2 77 and therefore arguably have at least
a persuasive effect on future panels' interpretations of GATT
271 For general summaries of past panel reports, see Robert E. Hudec, A Statistical
Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1
(1993); PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(1996).
272 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 57 (1990).
273 Id. See also Andrew W. Stewart, "I Tell Ya I Don't Get No Respect!" The
Policies Underlying Standards of Review in U.S. Courts as a Basis for Deference to
Municipal Determinations in GATT Panel Appeals, 23 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 749,
757 (1992).
274 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 57 (1990).
271 PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., 1 HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
pt. 2, 21-24 (1996).
276 See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1227, 1272-73 (1992). As one
commentator put it, "rather than build a worthwhile body of case law, panels seemed to
be reinventing the wheel." Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism:
Its Present Situation andIts Prospects, 10 J. INT'L ARBIT. 27, 38 (1993).
277 JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 57 (1990).
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
1994.278 This conclusion is supported by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties which directs that "any subsequent practice
in the application of the treaties" be taken into account when
interpreting a treaty. 79  It therefore follows that past panel
decisions are instructive, but not binding, upon a current panel
evaluating a disputed measure under GATT 1994.280
A. Article III:4: National Treatment
The basic purpose of Article III of GATT 1994 is to prevent
the Members from using their fiscal and regulatory powers to
economically protect domestic production."' Specifically, the
purpose of Article 111:4 is to prevent Members from enacting
measures that treat imported products "less favorably" than "like"
domestic products.282 The pertinent part of Article 111:4 states that
"[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin... ,,283 The most crucial requirements of Article
III:4 are that the products at issue are "like" and the treatment of
the imported products under the disputed measure is "less
favorable. 2
84
Because the drafters of GATT 1947 did not define the term
"like," panels have been left to arrive at their own definitions. The
Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments285 concluded that
278 Id. at 67-69. Most recent panel reports have relied on past panel decisions and
those that have not have been the subject of greater criticism. Mora, supra note 47, at
179.
279 Vienna Convention, supra note 240.
280 It is unclear, however, whether different weight should be afforded to panel
reports, working party reports, Appellate Body reports, or to reports that are adopted, as
opposed to those that are unadopted. It has been suggested, however, that Appellate
Body reports will likely be highly considered in the future. Mora, supra note 47, at 163.
281 U.S. Alcohol panel report, supra note 47, para. 5.25. For a discussion of the
drafting history and the purposes of Article 111:4 see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT 279-86 (1969),
282 GATT 1994 supra note 5, art. 1II:4 (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. 111:4,
reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 115).
283 Id. (emphasis added).
284 For a discussion of the term "like" see Rex J. Zedalis, A Theory of the GATT
"Like" Product Common Language Cases, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1994).
285 Dec. 2, 1970, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97 (1972) (adopted) [hereinafter
280 [Vol. 22
GASOLINE WTO PANEL DECISION
the determination of whether products were like should be made
on a case-by-case basis .1 6 The Border Tax report also suggested
that when deciding whether two products were "like," panels
should consider "the product's end-uses in a given market;
consumer's tastes and habits, which change from country to
country; [and] the product's properties, nature, and quality.""2 7
In the U.S. Alcohol panel report,28 the panel analyzed the issue
of whether beers with different alcohol contents were "like"
products. 9 This panel emphasized that this determination should
be made "not only in the light of such criteria as the products'
physical characteristics, but also in the light of the purpose of
Article III, which is to ensure that internal taxes and regulations
[are] 'not. . . applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production."' 29  This panel also
cautioned that the determination of likeness should not be made in
such a way as to "unnecessarily infringe upon" the domestic
regulatory authority of the contracting party.29'
If products are found to be "like" under Article 111:4, a panel
must then consider whether the disputed measure treats the
imported product "less favorably." '292 Again, the drafters of GATT
1947 failed to define this term. As a result, each panel that
considers an Article 111:4 dispute must decide anew the meaning of
"less favorable treatment."
According to the U.S. Alcohol panel, the basic description of
Border Tax panel report]. The Border Tax Working Party was charged with examining
the provisions of GATT 1947 that were relevant to border tax adjustments. Id. para. 1.
286 Id. para. 18.
287 Id.
288 U.S. Alcohol panel report, supra note 47. This dispute concerned regulation of
beer and wine by certain U.S. states. Id. paras. 2.3-2.6.
289 Id. paras. 5.70-5.75. The panel was considering high and low alcohol beer. Id.
j ara. 5.70.
290 Id. para. 5.71 (citation omitted in original). The panel recognized that low and
high alcohol beer are similar based upon their physical characteristics. However, the
panel based its conclusion ,that the burdens of the U.S. law did not fall more heavily on
Canada and that there was market differentiation and specialization between the two
beer types, on the fact that the law at issue did not differentiate between imported and
domestic beer of each category, concluding that they were not like products. Id. paras.
5.73-5.75.
291 Id. para. 5.72.
292 GATT 1994 supra note 5, art. III:4 (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. 111:4,
repinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 115).
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"less favorable" treatment was when "like" foreign products were
treated differently than domestic products.293 Because, "no less
favorable" treatment meant that a measure should "accord
imported products competitive opportunities no less favorable than
those accorded to domestic products," this panel concluded that
different treatment that resulted in "unequal competitive
opportunities" for the foreign product was "less favorable"
treatment.2 94
The U.S. Alcohol panel also considered whether foreign
products were treated "less favorably" than "like" domestic
products where the foreign producers were treated "no less
favorably" than certain "similarly situated" domestic producers.295
The panel rejected the "similarly situated" argument by noting that
the ordinary meaning of Article 111:4 is that "like" products, not
producers, are to be treated "no less favorably."'2 96 Because Article
111:4 addresses the relative competitive opportunities created by a
government in its market, if the measure's different treatment
disadvantages the "like" foreign product, the product is denied an
"equal competitive opportunity" and therefore treated "less
favorably," in violation of GATT 1947, regardless of the
comparative situation of its producer.
2 97
The United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
report298 addressed the similar issue of whether less favorable
treatment of "like" imported products in some instances could be
offset by more favorable treatment of the same "like" products in
293 U.S. Alcohol panel report, supra note 47. The U.S. Alcohol panel considered
whether statutes required that imported wine and beer be sold only through in-state
middlemen, while some like domestic wine and beer could be sold directly to retailers.
Id. para. 5.29.
294 Id. para. 5.30. The U.S. Alcohol panel report found that because imported beer
and wine could under no circumstances be sold directly to retailers, imported beer and
wine had unequal competitive opportunities. Id. para. 5.33.
295 Id. para. 3.52.
296 Id. para. 5.19.
297 Id. para. 5.31. Based on its findings, the U.S. Alcohol panel report found that
the measures treated imported beer and wine less favorably than domestic beer and wine.
Id. para. 5.32.
298 U.S. 337 panel report, supra note 191. This dispute concerned a special
procedure for enforcing patent infringement claims that only applied to imported goods.
Id. para. 2.1.
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other instances.2 Noting that the purpose of Article 111:4 is to
protect "expectations on the competitive relationship between
imported and domestic products,"3°° the panel cautioned that
acceptance of this rule would introduce "great uncertainty into the
conditions of competition between imported and domestic
products" because "it would entitle a contracting party to derogate
from the no less favorable treatment obligation in one case, or
indeed in respect of one contracting party on the ground that it
accords more favorable treatment in some other case, or to another
contracting party." '' Because a panel must base its decision on
the distinctions made by and the potential impact of the measure
itself, rather than the actual consequences of the measure, the
panel rejected the "on the whole" argument, concluding that
Article 111:4 should be analyzed based upon "the distinction made
by the [measures] themselves and on their potential impact, rather
than on the actual consequences for specific imported products."3 2
B. Article XY. National Policy Exceptions
Article XX of GATT 1994 provides limited exceptions to the
general obligations of the Members for measures based on national
policy considerations. The exceptions in Article XX were
intended by the drafters of GATT 1947 to justify regulations
promoting overriding policy goals even if they violate other
articles of GATT 1947.303 The exceptions relevant to the U.S.
Gasoline dispute are Article XX(b), (d), and (g) which state in
part:
299 Id. para. 5.12. In some cases, the special procedure was more beneficial to
imported goods than the federal court procedure that applied to domestic goods, but in
others the procedure for domestic products was more beneficial. Id. paras. 3.15-3.20.
300 Id. para. 5.13.
301 Id. paras. 5.14 (citing United States Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34 Supp.) at 136, para. 5.19 (1988)
(adopted)).
302 Id. para. 5.14. The U.S. 337 panel report thus found that all patent infringement
claims should be handled through the same procedure. Id.
303 For a discussion of Article XX see Anderson, supra note 12, at 758-63; JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 206-08 (1989); Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the
Environmental Exceptions in GATTArticleXX, 25 no.5 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1991); Jan
Klabbers, Jurisprudence in International Trade Law: Article XY of GA TT, 26 J. WORLD
TRADE 63 (1992).
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in [GATT
1994] shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any [WTO Member] of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws.. which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of [GATT 1994] . .; [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 4
These exceptions are interpreted narrowly and the burden of
proof falls on the party invoking them. 5 In fact, because it is so
difficult to qualify for protection under the Article XX exceptions,
some commentators have argued this provision is merely a weak
national treatment clause.0 6 If, however, the exceptions are argued
in the alternative, it is not an admission that the measures in
dispute are inconsistent with GATT 1994.307
1. Article XY(b): Life and Health Protection
Article XX(b) was drafted to justify quarantines and other
sanitary measures by individual contracting parties.0 The main
issue under this section is the scope of the term "necessary."30 9
This issue was considered by the Thailand Restrictions on
304 GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(b), (d), (g) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art.
XX(b), (d), (g), reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518) (emphasis added).
305 U.S. Tuna I panel report I, supra note 14, para. 5.22.
306 Kelly Jude Hunter, International Environmental Agreements in Conflict with
GATT--Greening GATTAfter the Uruguay Round, 30 INT'L LAW. 163, 167 (1996),
307 U.S. Tuna I panel report, supra note 14, para. 5.22.
308 Id. para. 5.27.
309 Id. It has been noted that the original drafters of GATT 1947 intended
"necessary" to be interpreted in a scientific sense; however, more recent panel decisions
have focused on the term "necessary" in a theoretical sense. Steve Charnovitz, Green
Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade
Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 326-27 (1994).
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Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes report.1 The Thai
Cigarette panel determined that a measure was "necessary" under
Article XX(b) only if "there were no alternative measures
consistent with [GATT 1947], or less inconsistent with it . . .
[that] could reasonably be expected to [be] employ[ed] to achieve
. . . policy objectives."3"' Based on the analysis in the Thai
Cigarette report, a regulation is necessary under Article XX(b)
only if it is the most consistent with GATT 1994 of all the
available alternatives. 2
The U.S. Tuna I panel also considered whether a measure was
"necessary" under Article XX(b).313 This panel reiterated the
requirement that a measure is not "necessary" unless the
contracting party seeking justification under Article XX(g) "had
exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its . . .
protection objectives through measures consistent with [GATT
1947], in particular through the negotiation of international
cooperative arrangements . ,,3 14 Even if a measure is the only
one reasonably available, the panel determined that a measure
could not be "necessary" if its requirements were based on
"unpredictable conditions" such that the foreign producer "could
not know whether, at a given point of time," they were in
conformance with the disputed measure.315 As a result, the panel
refused to justify this measure under Article XX(b).316
310 Thai Cigarette panel report, supra note 207, para. 1. This dispute concerned a
Thai ban on imported cigarettes that Thailand claimed was necessary to reduce domestic
consumption of cigarettes for health policy. Id. para. 66.
311 Id. para. 75. The Thai Cigarette-panel determined that Thailand could achieve
its health policy objectives by requiring complete disclosure on tobacco products,
banning unhealthy tobacco additives and banning tobacco advertising, measures that
Were consistent with other GATT 1947 provisions. Id. paras. 77-81. The Thai Cigarette
panel did not suggest any less inconsistent measures. Id.
312 Id. para. 74. Because there were consistent alternatives, the Thai Cigarette
report found that the ban on imported tobacco products was not necessary. Id. para. 81.
313 U.S. Tuna I panel report, supra note 14, paras. 5.24-5.29. This dispute
concerned the Marine Mammal Protection Act of the United States, 16 U.S.C. § 1361
(1994), a statute that prohibits the "taking" of marine mammals incidental to the
harvesting of tuna. U.S. Tuna I panel report, supra note 14, paras. 2.3-2.9.
314 U.S. Tuna I panel report, supra note 14, para. 5.27.
315 Id. Under the disputed statute, it was impossible for other countries to
determine at any point whether their policies were in conformity. Id.
316 Id. para. 5.29.
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2. Article XX(d): Consistent Law Compliance
Article XX(d) was drafted to allow individual contracting
parties to enforce laws that were consistent with GATT 1947."7
The scope of this exception is limited by the requirement that the
disputed regulation must have the function of "securing
compliance with" a law that does not violate GATT 1994."'
The panel in the EEC Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components report31 9 is the only panel that has considered the
issue of how broadly the phrase "to secure compliance with"
should be interpreted.32° The question was whether this phrase
meant only that "the measure must prevent actions inconsistent
with" the GATT 1947 consistent measures, or whether it covers "a
measure which [is] consistent with" the GATT 1947 consistent
measure, but undermines the GATT 1947 consistent measures
objective. 32 The EEC Parts panel determined that based on the
text and purpose of Article XX(d), only "measures related to the
enforcement of obligations under [measures] consistent with"
GATT 1947 were covered. 322
3. Article XX(g): Natural Resource Conservation
Article XX(g) was drafted to ensure that a contracting party
could preserve its exhaustible resources.323  The main issue
addressed by Article XX(g) is the scope of the phrases "relating
317 See GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(d) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art.
XX(d), reprinted in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 5, at 518).
318 See id.
319 May 16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (1991) (adopted) [hereinafter
EEC Parts panel report].
320 Id. paras. 5.14-5.18. This dispute concerned an EEC measure, Council
Regulation 2423/88, art. 13:10, 1988 J.O. (261) 1, which was designed to prevent
circumvention of anti-dumping regulations by imposing anti-circumvention duties. EEC
Parts panel report, supra note 319, para. 5.1.
321 Id. paras. 5.15.
322 Id. para. 5.18. The disputed regulation did not secure the payment of anti-
dumping duties. Id. Rather, the disputed regulation discouraged the circumvention of
anti-dumping duties. Id. Therefore, the EEC's anti-circumvention duties were not
protected by Article XX(d) because they served merely to enforce the objectives of the
general anti-dumping regulations. Id.
323 GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX(g) (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(g),
reprinted in ANALYTICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 586 (1994)).
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to" and "in conjunction with."324
The question faced by the panel in the Canada Herring and
Salmon report325 was if the phrase "relating to" required a
"particular relationship" between the disputed regulation and the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources under Article
XX(g).126 This panel determined that the phrase "relating to" had a
broader meaning than that of "necessary" or "essential. 3 27  The
panel also concluded, however, that the disputed measure must be
at least "primarily aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible
resources.3 2' As a result, the Canada Herring and Salmon report
limited the application of Article XX(g) by requiring that the
disputed regulation have a particular relationship with the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.329
The Canada Herring and Salmon panel also considered the
meaning of the phrase "in conjunction with., 33' The panel
interpreted this phrase "in a way that ensure[d] that the scope of
possible actions under [Article XX(g)] correspond[ed] to the
purpose for which it was included in [GATT 1947].,331 Again, the
panel concluded that a measure could "only be considered to be
324 Id.
325 Canada Herring and Salmon panel report, supra note 249, at 98.
326 Id. para. 4.5. This dispute concerned a Canadian export prohibition on certain
types of herring and salmon. Id. paras. 2.1-2.6. Canada argued that while the disputed
measures prohibited exports on certain unprocessed salmon and herring were not
conservation measures per se, they had an effect on conservation because they helped to
provide statistical foundation for harvesting restrictions. Id. para. 4.7.
327 Id. para. 4.6. The panel came to this conclusion by comparing the phrase
"relating to" in Article XX(g) to more restrictive terms such as "necessary" and
"essential" in Article XX(b) and (d). Id.
328 Id. The panel limited the scope of the phrase "relating to" because the purpose
of including Article XX was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy
purposes; rather, its purpose was to ensure that commitments under GATT 1947 do not
hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustible resources. Id.
The Canada Herring and Salmon panel found that the export prohibitions were not
primarily aimed at conservation of salmon and herring because Canada could collect
statistical data without imposing export prohibitions and because the export prohibitions
did not limit access to the fish in general, but only access by foreign processors and
consumers to the fish in unprocessed form. Id. Therefore, the panel considered the
prohibitions not covered by Article XX(g). Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
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made effective 'in conjunction with' production restrictions if it
was primarily aimed at rendering effective these [domestic]
restrictions." '332 The Canada Herring and Salmon panel therefore
required only that the disputed measure's demands upon foreign
producers have a particular relationship with ensuring that the
disputed measure's; demand upon domestic producers are
effective.333
The U.S. Canada Tuna panel334  also considered the
interpretation of the phrase "in conjunction with." '335 This panel
interpreted the phrase literally, requiring only that disputed
measure's restrictions on foreign producers was reflected by a
corresponding restriction on domestic producers.336 Under this
rule, the "in conjunction with" requirement would be met simply
by a measure's application to both foreign and domestic
producers.337
4. Article XXPreamble
The purpose of the preamble of Article XX is to prevent the
use by a contracting party of the specific exceptions as a vehicle
for protective measures. Such misuse is prevented by the
requirements that any excepted measures cannot be applied in a
manner that would constitute "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable
discrimination" or a "disguised" restriction on international
trade.338
Few panels have considered the requirements of the preamble
of Article XX. One that did was the U.S. Canada Tuna panel.339
This panel concluded, without detailed explanation, that because
actions similar to the one at issue had been taken against countries
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1983) (adopted) [hereinafter
U.S. Canada Tuna panel report]. For further discussion of the U.S. Canada Tuna panel
report see infra notes 339-342 and accompanying text.
335 Id. para. 4.9.
336 Id. para. 4.11.-
337 Id.
338 GATT 1994, supra note 5, art. XX preamble (GATT 1947, supra note 5, art.
XX preamble, reprinted in ANALYTICAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 518).
339 U.S. Canada Tuna panel report, supra note 334.
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other than the complaining contracting party, it did not constitute
"arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discrimination.' 4  In a similarly
facile manner, the panel determined that the disputed action was
not a "disguised" restriction on international trade because it was
publicly announced as a trade measure only.34' The panel therefore
found a disputed measure was acceptable under the Article XX
preamble if it applied to countries other than the complaining
contracting party and if it was publicly announced. 2
The other panel that considered the requirements of the
preamble was the United States Imports of Certain Automotive
Spring Assemblies panel 34 ' Noting that the preamble focuses on
the application of the measure and not the measure itself, this
panel found that the disputed measure was not applied in a manner
constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because it
applied to all foreign countries?" The U.S. Spring Assemblies
panel therefore held that the dispute measure was not a disguised
restriction on international trade because it applied to countries
other than the complaining contracting party.345
It can be observed, based upon these descriptions of past panel
reports, that for the most part, Article III:4 and Article XX(b), (d),
and (g) of GATT 1947 have been interpreted narrowly. The
exception to this strict interpretation is the analysis of the
preamble of Article XX, which has been broadly interpreted the
few times that panels have considered it. The level of adherence to
these past reports by the U.S. Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body
would provide an opportunity to evaluate how influential past
reports will be upon future panels' consideration of GATT 1994
and more importantly,. how GATT will be interpreted.
340 Id. para. 4.8.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 United States Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, May 26, 1983,
GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107 (1984) (adopted) [hereinafter U.S. Spring
Assemblies panel report].
31 Id. para. 55.
341 Id. para. 56.
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V. The Significance of the U.S. Gasoline Reports
The significance of the U.S. Gasoline Reports is more easily
understood in the context of the new dispute resolution mechanism
of the DSU and the reports of past panels. Most basically, the U.S.
Gasoline Reports are the first panel and Appellate Body reports to
be issued under the authority of the DSU and the WTO.346 They
also concern a dispute over a United States environmental
regulation brought under the new GATT 1994 dispute resolution
mechanism. These Reports therefore illustrate the most recent
developments in the areas of domestic environmental protection
and dispute resolution. Together, these developments are
significant because they raise issues regarding the domestic
sovereignty of the United States. The U.S. Gasoline Reports,
therefore, are representative of some of the most important
contemporary issues concerning global trade and environmental
protection.
A. Articles 111.4 and XX(a), (b), and (g)
The U.S. Gasoline Reports are significant firstly because they
indicate how United States environmental legislation will be
treated under Articles 111:4 and XX(a), (b), and (g) of GATT 1994.
In the past, GATT 1947 has been less than environmentally
friendly. The word "environment" does not appear anywhere in
GATT 1947 or GATT 1994, 34' and no environmental regulation
considered by a panel has ever been found to be consistent with
GATT 1947 . It was against this environmentally hostile
background that the U.S. Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body
evaluated the consistency of the Gasoline Rule under GATT 1994.
The U.S. Gasoline Panel chose to rely upon past panel
decisions for much of its analysis. Following the direction of the
Border Tax report, the U.S. Gasoline Panel interpreted Article III:4
narrowly and determined that imported reformulated gasoline and
34 Sanger, supra note 19, at C5.
117 Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and
Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 405 (1993).
348 Elizabeth E. Kruis, The United States Trade Embargo on Mexican Tuna: A
Necessary Conservationist Measure or an Unfair Trade Barrier?, 14 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 903, 928 (1992).
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domestic reformulated gasoline had similar properties and were
therefore "like" products.3 49 The U.S. Gasoline Panel then found
that based on the U.S. Alcohol report's "equal competitive
opportunities" test, the Gasoline Rule treated imported gasoline
"less favorably.""35 The U.S. Gasoline Panel also relied upon the
U.S. Alcohol report to reject the United States' argument that
"like" imported reformulated gasoline was not treated "less
favorably" because similarly situated foreign and domestic
producers were treated similarly."' In addition, the U.S. Gasoline
Report cited the U.S. 337 report to reject the argument that
imported reformulated gasoline was "on the whole" treated "no
less favorably" than domestic reformulated gasoline. 52 In its
narrow interpretation and application of Article 111:4 of GATT
1994, the U.S. Gasoline Panel signaled an adherence to past panel
decisions that strictly interpreted Article 111:4 to the detriment of
environmental measures.
The U.S. Gasoline Panel was also narrow in its interpretation
and application of the Article XX exceptions of GATT 1994. By
finding that the Gasoline Rule was not "necessary" under Article
XX(b) unless no inconsistent or less inconsistent measures were
available to protect human, animal or plant life or health, the U.S.
Gasoline Panel adhered to the Thai Cigarette report. 353 The U.S.
Gasoline Panel based its exclusion from Article XX(d) of
measures that were not designed to "secure compliance with"
GATT 1994 consistent measures on the EEC Parts report.354
Relying on the Canada Herring and Salmon report, the U.S.
Gasoline Panel also declined to justify the measure under Article
XX by interpreting Article XX(g) to mean that in order to be
"related to," the disputed measure must be at least "primarily
aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible resources.355 Even
349 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, paras. 6.5-6.9 (citing Border Tax
panel report, supra note 285, para. 18).
350 Id. para. 6.10 (citing U.S. Alcohol panel report, supra note 47, para. 5.31).
351 Id. paras. 6.11-6.13 (citing U.S. Alcohol panel report, supra note 47, para. 5.19).
352 Id. paras. 6.14-6.15 (citing U.S. 337 panel report, supra note 191, paras. 5.13-
5.14).
353 Id. para. 6.24 (citing Thai Cigarette panel report, supra note 207, para. 75).
354 Id. para. 6.33 (citing EEC Parts panel report, supra note 319, para. 5.18).
355 Id. para. 6.39 (citing Canada Herring and Salmon panel report, supra note 249,
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though they were not so required, the U.S. Gasoline Panel
interpreted and applied Article XX(b), (d), and (g) of GATT 1994
in a manner consistent with past panel reports, again indicating
that the Panel approved of the narrow interpretations of Article XX
by previous panels considering environmental measures.
The U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report was more selective
in its deference to past panel reports. Following the Panel Report,
the Appellate Body relied upon the Canada Herring and Salmon
report to interpret the Article XX(g) phrase "relating to" as,
requiring that the disputed measure be "primarily aimed at" the
conservation of natural resources.356  The Appellate Body,
however, gave a broader reading of the "primarily aimed at"
requirement than had the Panel and the Canada Herring and
Salmon panel.357 Rather than being necessary to conserve natural
resources as required by the Panel, a measure must only have a
substantial relationship with the conservation of natural resources,
determined on a case-by-case basis, in order to meet the "relating
to" requirement of Article XX(g).358
In its interpretation of the only other requirement of Article
XX(g), that the measure must be made "in connection with"
restrictions on domestic production, the Appellate Body followed
the U.S. Canada Tuna report by interpreting the phrase literally,
requiring merely that the disputed measure must affect both
domestic and foreign production.359 Like the Panel, the U.S.
Gasoline Appellate Body relied heavily upon past panel reports to
analyze Article XX(g). The Appellate Body did, however, give
broader interpretations to previous reports in a manner that was
more favorable for Member nations' environmental measures.
Evaluating the preamble of Article XX, the Appellate Body
broke from the interpretations of previous panels and applied the
requirements more strictly.36 Both the U.S. Canada Tuna report
para. 4.6). It has been noted that past panels applied a more stringent test, requiring
more of the criteria applied under the necessary test. Miller, supra note 13, at 505.
356 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 10-13 (citing Canada
Herring and Salmon panel report, supra note 249, para. 4.6).
351 Id. at 11-13.
358 Id. at 13.
359 Id. at 14 (citing U.S. Tuna I panel report, supra note 14, at paras. 4.10-4.11).
360 Id. at 16-20.
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and the U.S. Spring Assemblies report required merely that the
measure at issue apply to other foreign countries in order not to be
"unjustifiable" or "arbitrary" discrimination36' and that the measure
be publicly announced in order to avoid being a "disguised"
restriction on international trade.362 These simplistic requirements
were not even mentioned by the Appellate Body. According to the
Appellate Body, if a country does not "count the costs" to foreign
producers and does not attempt to "mitigate" those costs through
cooperation with foreign governments, their actions constitute
both "unjustifiable" and "arbitrary" discrimination and a
"disguised" restriction on international trade.3 63  The Appellate
Body therefore rejected previous panels' more permissible
standards, in favor of a more restrictive interpretation of the
preamble to Article XX.
GATT 1947 was drafted with the sole purpose of promoting
free trade among the CONTRACTING PARTIES. It is not surprising
therefore that previous panels have interpreted the provisions of
GATT 1947 strictly in order to protect free trade. Significantly,
GATT 1947 was drafted before environmental concerns were
widespread and, as a result, was not hospitable to measures that
impeded trade between the CONTRACTING PARTIES, even if they
were designed to protect the environment rather than domestic
producers. Thus, no panel has ever found an environmental
measure to be consistent with GATT 1947.' 64
Following the reasoning of past panel reports, the U.S.
Gasoline Panel slavishly observed their restrictive holdings, while
the U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body was more selective, choosing to
disregard the broader interpretations of GATT 1947 by past panel
reports. By adhering to a restrictive analysis of GATT 1994, the
Panel Report appeared to signal a carry-over of the non-
environmentally friendly policies of GATT 1947 to the newly
created WTO. In contrast, the Appellate Body declined to follow
361 U.S. Canada Tuna panel report, supra note 334, para. 4.8; U.S. Spring
Assemblies panel report, supra note 343, para. 55.
362 U.S. Canada Tuna panel report, supra note 334, para. 4.8; U.S. Spring
Assemblies panel report, supra note 343, para. 56.
363 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 17-20.
364 Kruis, supra note 348, at 928.
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past reports' analyses. However, the analyses that the Appellate
Body rejected were broad readings of GATT 1947 that would have
been amiable to environmental measures. Even so, the Appellate
Body's lack of regard for past reports could encourage future
panels to break with past reports in reconciling environmental
measures with free trade goals. In addition, where the Appellate
Body relied upon past reports, it applied broader readings to the
rulings of previous panels, indicating another means by which free
trade could be harmonized with environmental protection.365
While both Reports betrayed an inherent preference for trade, the
deference to the precedents of the past by the Panel emphasized
the conflicts between the international trade rules of GATT 1994
and the environmental regulations of the United States, while the
Appellate Body's Report suggested ways in which the two can be
reconciled.
The Panel's deferential line of analysis and the Appellate
Body's rejection of the broader interpretations of GATT 1947
seem logical when viewed from the prospective of free trade
advocates. The principal purpose of the WTO is to liberalize
world trade policies "through the reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and . . . the elimination of discriminatory
,0366treatment in international trade relations. Based upon this goal,
GATT 1994 should be interpreted and applied strictly in order to
encourage global free trade, an effort that in turn will result in
greater global economic development and prosperity.3 67
When the U.S. Gasoline Reports are considered in the context
of environmental concerns, however, their strict interpretations of
GATT 1947 are less logical. Though free trade may be a desirable
goal of international agreements, it may also encourage destruction
of the environment.3 6' To many, environmental protection should
365 See Stephen L. Kass, Clean Air, Trade and WTO's New International Law, 215
N.Y.L.J. no. 106, June 3, 1996.
366 WTO Agreement, supra note 4, preamble, 33 I.L.M. at 1144. "In the WTO, it's
trade uber-alles." Paul Blustein, Buchanan Attacks Put Trade Group on Spot: Experts
Dispute Candidate's View of WTO, WASH. POST, Feb.16, 1996, at B 1.
367 For a discussion of the arguments of free trade supporters, see Bernabe-
Riefkohl, supra note 13, at 207-11.
368 For a discussion of the arguments of the environmentalists, see Bernabe-
Riefkohl, supra note 13, at 210-12. There are those, however, who argue that free trade
will actually encourage environmental protection by stimulating the development of the
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be the more desirable goal.169 Following this line of thought, the
U.S. Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body should perhaps have
interpreted GATT 1994 more broadly.370
A broader interpretation would have also recognized that many
environmental regulations are not aimed at distorting global
trade37" ' and that it is often very difficult to construct
environmentally sustainable, politically viable, internationally
enforceable environmental measures that do not affect foreign
producers differently than domestic producers." The possibility
of a broader interpretation of GATT 1994 is further supported by
the fact the U.S. Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body were not
required to follow the analysis of any past panel reports.373
Considering these arguments, it seems inappropriate for the U.S.
Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body to have been so narrow in
their readings of Article III:4 and Article XX(b), (d), and (g) of
GATT 1994. 374
wealth required to protect the environment. See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade &
Environment: The False Conflict, in TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 159, 161-64 (1993)
(addressing "fallacies" about the effect of free trade on the environment); John H.
Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992) (arguing that in the long run, trade and the
environment do not conflict); Schoenbaum, supra note 13, at 702 (asserting that "there
is no fundamental conflict between GATT [1947] rules and the need to protect
environmental quality"); Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in
Sustainable Development: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 728 (1992) (calling
for the linking of "environmental protection and free trade in the framework of
environmentally sustainable development").
369 See generally Anderson, supra note 12, at 754 (asserting that "our reliance upon
the earth" justifies the use of GATT 1947-inconsistent measures to protect the
environment); Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 13, at 229 (arguing that "[t]o avoid a future
environmental collapse" "international trade policies should not prevail over.., laws to
protect the environment"); Goldman, supra note 13, at 1297 (noting that "[i]t is simply
unacceptable to presume the preeminence of the trade regime" over environmental
protection).
370 It has been suggested that Article XX is potentially the most helpful for
protecting environmental concerns within the framework of GATT 1994. Miller, supra
note 13, at 498-99.
371 But cf Rod Hunter, EU Recycle Laws Could Spark Trade War, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
18, 1996, at A19, A21 (arguing that environmental laws result in trade distortion).
372 Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 12,'at 777; Miller, supra note 13, at 487-88.
373 For a general discussion of WTO jurisprudence, see supra notes 271-280 and
accompanying text.
374 But see Rod Hunter, supra note 371, at Al9, A21; cf. Shailagh Murray,
European Countries' Rules on Labor, Environment Hinder a Single Market, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 11, 1996, at B 1 B (asserting that trade routes are clogged by laws on the
19961
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
One consequence, therefore, of the U.S. Gasoline Panel and
Appellate Body Reports is that their narrow interpretation of
GATT 1994 may become quasi-precedent for disputes concerning
environmental measures. If this prediction is accurate, Members
of the WTO may find their domestic environmental legislation
threatened by adverse WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions.
This possibility has lead to the concern that domestic sovereignty
of the United States in environmental protection is unjustifiably
encroached upon by the WTO.375
B. Dispute Resolution
Another significant aspect of the U.S. Gasoline Reports is their
illustration of the reforms in the GATT 1994 dispute settlement
process ushered in by the DSU under the WTO. Dispute
resolution under Article XXII and Article XXIII of GATT 1947
was diplomatic in manner--that is it was accomplished by
cooperation and negotiation between the disputing Members rather
than judicial-like procedures.376 As a result, dispute resolution was
time consuming and often produced decisions that were
unenforceable.377 It was problems such as these that the Members
of the WTO hoped to eliminate by adopting the DSU, thereby
establishing a more legalistic dispute resolution system where
disputes are resolved through quasi-judicial procedures rather than
through diplomacy and negotiation.37
The success of DSU was showcased in the resolution of the
environment).
375 See Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 13, at 224-27.
376 Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 479 (1994). This type of dispute resolution aims at
"lowering tensions, defusing conflicts, and promoting compromise." Id. But cf. JOHN H.
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 59-61 (1990) (arguing that the GATT
1947 dispute settlement process is more legalistic).
377 See Richard 0. Cunningham, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Did We Get What
the United States Needs, Or Did We Give Up the Only Remedy That Really Worked, in
THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT 547, 552-57 (1995);
Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND: A
RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180, 181-84 (Jeffrey
J. Schott ed., 1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 66-67
(1990); Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 479-80.
378 See Dillon, supra note 7, at 392-98; Shell, supra note 135, at 832. This view
has been criticized because losing parties may refuse to implement the recommendations
of the reports, thus causing increased hostility between nations and undermining
attempts to negotiate a solution between nations. Dillon, supra note 7, at 396.
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U.S. Gasoline dispute. This dispute began in January of 1995
when consultations with the United States were requested by
Venezuela.379 The consultations were held within one month of the
request, and after their failure, a petition to establish a panel was
forwarded to the DSB by Venezuela in March.3 0 The Panel was
automatically established by the beginning of April, and by the
end of the month, the parties had agreed upon the its
composition."8 The same procedure was commenced in April by
Brazil, resulting in the establishment of a panel by the end of May
that was merged with the already established Venezuelan Panel.382
The Panel issued its final Report in January of 1996,383 after
meeting with the parties384 and issuing an interim report.385 The
United States announced its intention to appeal the Report in
February3 6 and made its submissions to the Appellate Body in
March.387 By April, the Appellate Body had conducted oral
hearings and issued its Report rejecting the United States'
appeal.38 In June the United States announced its intention to
meet its obligations with respect to the findings and
recommendations of the Appellate Body and invited public
suggestions as to how the Gasoline Rule should be reformed.389
Comparing the process of resolving this GATT 1994 dispute
and the rules of the DSU to the process that was employed in
GATT ,1947 disputes, the success of the reforms is evident. Once
Venezuela and Brazil requested a panel, one was established
automatically in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU within a
379 U.S. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 17, para. 1.1.
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 Id. paras. 1.2-1.3.
383 Id. para. 1. 10.
384 Id. paras. 1.7, 1.9.
385 Id. para. 1.9. The Panel did delay the issuance of its final report beyond the
recommended six months. Id. para. 1.8.
386 U.S. to Appeal a Ruling on Imported Gasoline, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 21, 1996,
B10.
387 U.S. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 18, at 1.
388 Id. at 1-2.
389 United States Trade Representative, What's New File, Press Releases, Issued
During 1996, June, U.S. Invites Public Comment on Next Step in WTO Dispute on EPA
Rules for Imported Gasoline (visited Nov. 15, 1996) <http://www.ustr.gov/>.
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month. The establishment of the Panel did not require a consensus
of the Members as it did before the DSU and therefore could not
be blocked. The composition of the Panel was also chosen
automatically, as called for in Article 8 of the DSU, again without
the pre-DSU possibility of blocking. The time that elapsed from
the composition of the Panel to the issuance of the Panel's final
Report did exceed the period of six months recommended by
Article 12 of the DSU, but fell within the DSU's absolute limit of
nine months, a much shorter time than was often taken before the
DSU when all that was required was that a panel act "without
undue delay."
Within the sixty days allowed by Article 17 of the DSU of the
decision by the United States to appeal the Panel's Report, the
Appellate Body had returned its Report, a process that did not
occur at all before the Appellate Body was created. This Report
was adopted automatically by the DSB under Article 17 and as a
result could not be blocked. Within the time allotted by Article
16, the United States responded that it would implement the
Appellate Body's recommendations and at present has a
reasonable amount of time under Article 21 to do so. If it fails to
satisfactorily implement the recommendations with the reasonable
period of time, compensation and suspension of obligations is
automatic and cannot be blocked.
This comparison illustrates the great improvement in GATT
1994 dispute resolution accomplished by the DSU. The new rules
have shortened the time period in which dispute resolution occurs,
removed the possibility that steps in this process can be blocked,
and increased the likelihood that the recommendations of the
reports will be implemented. In addition, the existence of
Appellate Body review will lessen the chances that GATT 1994
will be misinterpreted by panels.'"
A WTO with a stronger dispute resolution and enforcement
system will be better able to further the goals of global free
trade. 91 This new system will give "additional predictability and
390 Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1159.
391 See John H. Jackson, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic
Law: Reflections on the Boilerroom of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 595, 605 (1995); Lowenfeld, supra note 8, at 487.
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stability" to the international economic system, leading to better
allocation of investment and market decisions and enhancing
world welfare.392 Another consequence of the more efficient
dispute resolution procedures, however, is that other Member
nations can more easily challenge U.S. legislation as being GATT
1994 inconsistent and pressure the U.S. to implement GATT 1994
consistent measures in their place. The increased dispute
settlement powers of the WTO, therefore, have been criticized as a
threat to the domestic sovereignty of the U.S.393
C. The Sovereignty of the United States
When the impact of the U.S. Gasoline Reports upon United
States environmental measures and dispute resolution under
GATT 1994 are considered together, a larger significance is
discernible. Continued stridency of interpretation of GATT 1994
combined with the more effective dispute resolution mechanism of
the DSU could potentially threaten many United States
environmental measures because panels will be more likely to find
environmental measures in violation of GATT 1994, and these
adverse findings can no longer be appreciably delayed or
blocked.3 94 In effect, the conflict between free trade policies and
environmental protection policies could be heightened, with
domestic environmental policies potentially emerging as the
greatest loser.395
In this respect, the U.S. Gasoline Reports are also significant
because they may renew debate as to whether the WTO
impermissibly usurps the sovereignty of the United States. The
concept of sovereignty is rooted in the ability of a nation to control
its territory and citizens without interference from outside nations.
When a domestic environmental regulation, such as the Gasoline
Rule, is found to violate an international trade agreement like
GATT 1994, and this findings can be enforced as it can through
392 John H. Jackson, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law:
Reflections on the Boilerroom of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
595, 605 (1995).
393 Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1158-62 ("[T]he consequences of
engaging the dispute resolution system will be much more significant").
394 See Shell, supra note 135, at 831 n.4.
395 Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1143-44.
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the DSU, international law will influence, and possibly control,
domestic law. The conflict between international free trade
agreements and domestic environmental protection is therefore
inseparable from the conflict between international sovereignty
and national sovereignty.
As a result, the WTO's dispute settlement process has been
characterized, as an attack on the sovereignty of the United
States. 6 Opponents of the DSU have called its mechanisms "a
staggering rejection of our due process and democratic
procedures," '397 and a "Tyrannosaurs" that will "ransack" United
States laws.398 Such conclusions are based upon the fact that under
the DSU, laws made by the United States Congress and approved
by the President are subjectto review by WTO panels. Because
the citizens of the United States do not elect the members or the
officials who appoint the members of the WTO panels, it can be
argued that the panels do not have the power to require the United
States to comply with the Panel's recommendations
One of the most fervent critics of the WTO is Patrick
Buchanan. He has warned that "[w]e cannot allow panels of
foreign judges to dictate our laws to us," "9 and has called GATT
1994 "globaloney. 'O He even went so far as to threaten to pull
the United States out of the WTO if he is ever elected president. 1
Similar concerns for United States sovereignty are at the
heart of a bill that was introduced by then-Senator Dole that would
require the review of any WTO panel decision that was adverse to
the United States.4 2 Under the Dole Bill, the United States would
cease to be a member of the WT04 113 if a review Commission
4
396 See Editorial, Sayonara Sovereignty, UNION LEADER, Feb. 7, 1996.
197 Shell, supra note 135, at 831 n.4 (1995) (quoting Ralph Nader).
398 Id. (quoting Robert Byrd).
399 Sanger, supra note 19, at C1 (quoting Patrick Buchanan).
400 Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 13, at 227 n. 120 (quoting Patrick Buchanan).
401 Sanger, supra note 19, at C1 (quoting Patrick Buchanan). Buchanan renewed
calls for United States pull out of the WTO after the US-Gasoline Panel Report was
issued. Donna Smith, Kantor Says U.S. Will Appeal WTO Ruling, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, Jan. 18, 1996.
402 WTO Dispute Settlement Review, Commission Act, S. 1438, 104th Cong.
(1995), available in Westlaw G.A.T.T. database; see also H.R. 1434, 104th Cong.
(1995), available in Westlaw G.A.T.T. database.
403 S. 1438 § 6. This would be accomplished through a cancellation of
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determined that three panel reports were wrongly decided.4 5
Withdrawal from the WTO, however, would offend United States
trade partners to a much greater extent than would simply ignoring
the Panel's recommendations.4o6 It would also leave the United
States open to hostile trade measures, deprive the United States of
407the use of the DSU to challenge other countries trade measures,
and destroy the Members'- confidence in the rule-based system.4 0
There are others, however, that feel that "[t]here is nothing in
the WTO that takes away any element of sovereignty from
member countries" not already ceded by participation in GATT
1947 .409 Some sovereignty is relinquished for membership in an
international agreement regardless of its effects on environmental
regulations or dispute resolution mechanisms.41  Even under the
WTO, the effect of a panel or Appellate Body Report is the same
as it was under GATT 19474 If a report rules against a measure
of the United States, it is up to Congress to decide whether or not
to implement the WTO ruling.4" The DSB cannot repeal the
disputed measure, nor can a federal agency independently change
their procedures or refuse to enforce measures found to be GATT
1994 inconsistent.413 Though the ease with which retaliation may
be imposed has increased, the political and economic pressures are
Congressional approval of the WTO upon a joint resolution. Id.
404 Id. The Commission would be composed of five federal circuit court judges
appointed by the President. Id. § 3.
405 Id. § 4.
406 U.S. Rejection of Gasoline Ruling Would Send Negative Signal, WTO Officials
Say, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No.13, at A-23 (Jan. 22, 1996).
407 It has been noted that if we expect other countries to observe international
trading rules, we must be prepared to observe the rules we helped to write. Julius L.
Katz, GA TTIs Threatened by the Squeamish, WALL ST. J. Aug. 30, 1994, at A10.
408 JEFFREY J. SCHoTT, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 130 (1994).
409 Paul Blustein, supra note 366, at BI (quoting David Woods, a spokesman for
the WTO); see also Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1192-64.
410 Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1163.
411 Id.
412 Id.; see also The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative
Action, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
§ 2(a), available in Westlaw G.A.T.T. database.
413 Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1163; see also The Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, § 2(a) available in Westlaw G.A.T.T.
database.
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the same as under GATT 1947, making it just as unlikely that
retaliation would be used against the United States.414
In addition, because international law is now being applied to
individuals directly, sovereignty is something that possibly can no
longer be surrendered in the international sphere.415 In this new
world order, the role of the sovereign is to provide security to its
citizens--security that can only be provided by the strengthening of
international law.416 By reinforcing the rights of the United States
under the WTO, the sovereignty of the United States may have
actually been strengthened.417
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body Reports concern
a disputed environmental regulation of the United States and are
the first to be issued by the WTO under the new DSU. Both the
DSU and the past panel's interpretations of GATT 1947 in
environmental disputes have been criticized as impinging on the
domestic sovereignty of member nations. Because these two
issues meet in the U.S. Gasoline Panel Reports, they illustrate the
conflicts between free trade and environmental protection. The
findings of these Reports also allow observers to anticipate the
possible consequences of a non-environmentally friendly GATT
1994 enforced by the DSU and to suggest changes that would
lessen the tensions between international free trade and
environmental protection.
The U.S. Gasoline Reports may have incorrectly found that the
Gasoline Rule violated Article III:4 and was not justified by
Article XX(b),(d) or (g) of GATT 1994. The U.S. Gasoline Panel
and Appellate Body Report did follow past panel decisions in their
analyses-even though they were not required to do so. In fact,
the Appellate Body failed to follow past decisions in the second
half of its analysis. In light of the global concern for
414 See Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 16, at 1163.
415 See Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1685, 1695 (1995).
416 See id.
417 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the
President, Uruguay Round Agreements Act, GATT Uruguay Round Agreements: Report
on Environmental Issues, Aug. 1994.
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environmental protection, the U.S. Gasoline Reports perhaps
should have interpreted GATT 1994 in a less restrictive manner.
The U.S. Gasoline Panel could have found that the Gasoline
Rule did not violate Article 111:4 of GATT 1994. If the Panel had
considered the situation of the producer when determining whether
products are "like," the Panel could have concluded that gasoline
produced by foreign producers, none of whom could be monitored
by the EPA to verify the data necessary to establish individual
baselines, was "like" gasoline produced by domestic producers
who could not provide the data required by the EPA to establish an
individual baseline. The Panel could have used this same
reasoning to find that gasoline produced by foreign producers, all
of whom could not have individual baselines, was treated "no less
favorably" than gasoline produced by domestic producers who
could not have an individual baseline. This broad interpretation of
GATT 1994 would have recognized that the Gasoline Rule was
not enacted to protect domestic producers economically and would
have acknowledged the practical impossibility of allowing foreign
producers to establish individual guidelines based on data that the
EPA could not monitor.
The U.S. Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body also could have
expanded their interpretations of the exceptions in Article XX of
GATT 1994. Allowing environmental measures greater access to
these exceptions would recognize the need for environmental
protection without decreasing the reach of GATT 1994 over
non-environmental measures. The Panel could have interpreted
the term "necessary" in Article XX(b) to include measures that
were the least inconsistent with GATT 1994 of all the measures
that could be practically enacted and enforced. This expansion of
the scope of necessity would have recognized the difficulties of
passing effective and enforceable environmental legislation. The
U.S. Gasoline Panel could also have done away with the artificial
distinction between measures that "secure compliance with"
GATT 1994 consistent legislation and measures that help to
determine the method by which compliance with GATT 1994-
consistent legislation will be secured. Without this distinction,
Article XX(b) would be available for all regulations related to
environmental legislation. Finally, the term "relating to" in
Article XX(g) could have been interpreted by the Panel to include
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measures that were "primarily aimed at" conserving natural
resources in the most practical, not the most direct but impractical
way, as did the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body could also
have interpreted the requirements of the preamble of Article XX-
as had past panels--by requiring only that the measure be applied
to all foreign countries and be publicly announced. By broadening
the interpretation of the. applicable GATT 1994 articles, the U.S.
Gasoline Panel and Appellate Body could have made GATT 1994
more "environmentally friendly.
41
A better resolution to the conflict between U.S. environmental
measures and the rules of the WTO could be, however, for the
United States to craft environmental measures that treat foreign
producers as favorably as they treat domestic producers, or at least
attempt to negotiate agreements with foreign countries concerning
the preservation of natural resources if they are going to
promulgate measures treating foreign goods less favorably. This
would not be easy. For instance, if under the Gasoline Rule, all
reformulated gasoline producers were required to meet the same
statutory baseline, some domestic producers would have to
dramatically improve the quality of their gasoline and would
therefore resist this change. At the same time, some producers
currently producing cleaner gasoline would be allowed to relax
their standards--a result that would be opposed by environmental
activists. If all reformulated gasoline producers were allowed to
use their own data to establish an individual baseline, it would be
quite an undertaking to monitor the accuracy of foreign producers'
data and to take actions against foreign producers to prevent
violations of the Gasoline Rule. Because foreign producers would
face less risk of being caught in violation of the measure, domestic
producers would likely oppose this alternative.
Even if a GATT 1994 consistent Gasoline Rule would have
418 If GATT 1994 is not interpreted in a way that is more environmentally-friendly,
steps will have to be taken to insure that the environment can be effectively protected
through other means. Suggested alternatives include proposals for the WTO to rethink
its goals of free trade and development, Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 12, at 777;
proposals for the adoption by the WTO of environmental side measures like those of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, Miller, supra note 13, at 483; the harmonization
of environmental standards through global environmental agreements, EsTY, GREENING
THE GATT (1994); and the creation of international environmental dispute resolution
panels, Anderson, supra note 12, at 751.
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faced many political obstacles, it can now be achieved through the
stricter dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO, because the
Panel and Appellate Body can be blamed for the adoption of a less
politically popular measure that is fairer to foreign producers,
rather than the United States government. In this dispute, the
United States has chosen to comply with the recommendations of
the Appellate Body by changing the Gasoline Rule so that it is
consistent with GATT 1994, therefore avoiding the possibility of
suspension of concessions or obligations by Venezuela and Brazil
under the DSU. By reinforcing the position of the United States in
the WTO, the United States can better utilize the DSU to
invalidate laws of other Members, and maintain confidence in the
rules-based system of the WTO. Most importantly, the new
GATT 1994-consistent Gasoline Rule will continue to protect air
quality in the United States, but will no longer restrict
international trade.
The increased power of the dispute resolution mechanisms of
the DSU will also work to the advantage of the United States in its
enforcement of GATT 1994 against other WTO Members. By
removing the ability of Members to block the panel process, the
final report and retaliation, the DSU has given GATT 1994 a much
more efficient dispute resolution procedure and a much needed
enforcement mechanism that will be more effective in attaining
more liberalized trade, a result that will greatly benefit the United
States, as well as other'WTO'Members.
Concerns for the sovereignty of the United States under the
WTO are therefore misplaced. Primarily, the effects on national
sovereignty of GATT 1994 and the DSU are not significantly
different than they' were under GATT 1947. In addition, the
United States cannot hope to usurp the sovereignty of other
Members of the WTO without conceding some of its own.
Today's global community requires a new understanding of the
concept of sovereignty. Rather than defining national sovereignty
as the right of an elected national government to be the sole actor
of its citizens, national sovereignty must be re-formulated as the
right of an elected government to be the actor of its citizens when
it is best able and to allow international organizations to act for its
citizens when international action is best.
19961
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
If the United States cannot adopt GATT 1994 consistent
environmental measures, they can be achieved through the more
efficient and strict dispute resolution mechanisms of the DSU.
Such measures will better achieve the goal of obtaining
environmentally friendly free trade, therefore providing greater
economic opportunity to all WTO Members, without diminishing
efforts to protect the environment. Because membership in the
WTO ultimately benefits the United States, it actually strengthens
the United States' re-defined national sovereignty. As a result,
calls for the United States to reject the findings of WTO panels or
WTO membership are inappropriate. In their place should be
efforts to achieve a more environmentally protective WTO through
the strict enforcement of GATT 1994 against United States
environmental measures.
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